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A Theory of International Adjudication
Eric A. Posner1 and John C. Yoo2

Abstract. Some international tribunals, such as the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal and
the trade dispute panels set up under GATT, are “dependent” in the sense that the
judges are appointed by the state parties for the purpose of resolving a particular
dispute. If the judges do not please the state parties, they will not be used again.
Other international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and the new International Criminal Court, are
“independent” in the sense that the judges are appointed in advance of any
particular dispute and serve fixed terms. The conventional wisdom, which is
based mainly on the European experience, is that independent tribunals are more
effective at resolving disputes than dependent tribunals are. We argue that the
evidence does not support this view. We also argue that the evidence is more
consistent with the contrary thesis: the most successful tribunals are dependent.
However, selection effects and other methodological problems render a firm
conclusion impossible. We support our argument through an examination of
qualitative and quantitative evidence, and we argue that the European Court of
Justice is not a good model for international tribunals because it owes its success
to the high level of political and economic unification among European states.
We conclude with pessimistic predictions about the International Criminal Court,
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism, the newest international tribunals.

In the last few years, international dispute resolution has assumed an
unprecedented prominence in international politics. International courts once were linked
to the quixotic and ignored interwar efforts to bring about world peace through the
nonviolent settlement of disputes. Since World War II, however, international tribunals
have proliferated, with a noticeable acceleration since the end of the Cold War. Now,
international courts issue binding decisions that solve multibillion dollar trade disputes
between the world’s major trading powers. They enforce the laws of the sea involving
matters ranging from seizure of ships to law enforcement searches to the use of seabed
resources. They may have been a crucial force behind the integration of Europe into a
single economic and political unit. International courts even seek to protect the basic
human rights of citizens against their own governments, and to punish war criminals
throughout the world.3
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International courts have also had a growing effect on American foreign and
domestic policy. Appellate panels of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have declared
illegal favorable tax treatment for American exporters and American tariffs on steel
imports.4 At the end of last year, President Bush ordered the termination of the tariffs,
and Congress was considering new legislation to bring the tax code into harmony with
WTO requirements.5 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has issued multiple
judgments finding that American execution of foreign nationals has violated international
law.6 Although he United States Supreme Court and the involved states have for many
years refused to delay executions to allow claims based on international law to be heard,
this may be changing.7 More than 100 nations throughout the world have joined the
International Criminal Court (ICC), pledging themselves to bring war criminals to justice
wherever they are found. Although the United States has rejected the court as a violation
of American due process standards and separation of powers, it has been forced to wage a
vigorous diplomatic campaign to immunize its citizens from the court’s reach.
Prominent American officials and thinkers have criticized the move toward
formal international adjudication as a threat to American values and U.S. foreign policy.
Undersecretary of State John Bolton last year criticized the ICC as “an organization that
runs contrary to fundamental American precepts and basic Constitutional principles of
popular sovereignty, checks and balances, and national independence.”8 Judge Robert
Bork sees international courts as institutions that inexorably expand liberal ideologies.
“As the culture war has become global, so has judicial activism. Judges of international
courts—the [ICJ], the European Court of Human Rights, and, predictably, the new [ICC],
among other forums—are continuing to undermine democratic institutions and to enact
the agenda of the Liberal Left or New Class. Internationally, that agenda contains a toxic
measure of anti-Americanism.”9 In a recent book, Henry Kissinger reflected with dismay
that “in less than a decade, an unprecedented concept has emerged to submit international
politics to judicial procedures,” one that “has spread with extraordinary speed and has not
been subject to systematic debate.”10 He warns that international adjudication “is being
pushed to extremes which risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments;
historically the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and even witch
4
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hunts.”11 These views parallel those of international relations scholars of the realist
school, who regard international adjudication as either irrelevant or dangerously quixotic
in an anarchic world.12
In contrast, international legal academics have welcomed the turn to international
dispute resolution.13 Taking note of the success of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in achieving compliance with their
decisions, Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter created a “checklist” of the
attributes of these courts, and argue that other international courts should have these
attributes as well.14 International courts modeled on the ECJ and ECHR would be able to
create “global communities of law,” just as the ECJ and the ECHR have contributed to
the establishment of a European community of law, the European Union.15
What are the attributes of a successful international court? Effective international
tribunals, in Helfer and Slaughter’s view, are independent: they are composed of senior,
respected jurists with substantial terms; they have an independent fact-finding capacity;
their decisions are binding as international law; they make decisions on the basis of
“principle rather than power;” and they engage in high quality legal reasoning.16
Success of an international tribunal, they concede, at times depends on factors
outside of a court’s control, including the relationship of the state parties and their
domestic political institutions.17 But advocates of formal international dispute resolution
believe that international adjudication can serve a causal role: it not only reflects existing
international relationships; it also can bind states more closely together. To make this
point, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter distinguish
interstate dispute resolution where the adjudicators, their agenda, and enforcement of
decisions are all subject to veto by the individual national governments,18 and
transnational dispute resolution, where tribunals are more independent, private parties
have access, and domestic legal systems enforce the tribunals’ judgments.19 Keohane and
11
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his coauthors argue that “[l]egalization imposes real constraints on state behavior; the
closer we are to transnational third-party dispute resolution, the greater those constraints
are likely to be.”20 When states move from interstate dispute resolution to transnational
dispute resolution, the increasing court-like nature of the tribunal leads to stronger ties
between the states.
We argue that the story is more complicated than these observers have
recognized. Contrary to the arguments of some American officials and observers, we
argue that there is a useful role for international adjudication. International courts allow
states to overcome a limited set of cooperative problems in international affairs. We
argue that states engaged in bilateral cooperative relationships can obtain a number of
benefits from international tribunals as long as the tribunals are neutral as between the
states having a dispute, and render judgments that reflect the interests of the states at the
time that they agree to submit the dispute to the tribunal. States, for example, may wish to
settle a boundary dispute and are willing to accept an outcome within a certain range,
rather than go to war or engage in other costly coercive measures. International tribunals
bring to bear expertise in determining the boundary, can produce more information about
the facts of the dispute and the preferences of states, and provide (in the ideal case) a
neutral arbiter that can help states overcome prisoners’ dilemma problems. An indictment
of international courts that rejects all forms of international dispute settlement overlooks
the helpful function that international courts can provide in limited circumstances.
However, we are skeptical of the views of the international legal academics. On
our view, tribunals are simple problem-solving devices. They do not transform the
interests of states; nor do they cause states to ignore their own interest for the sake of a
transnational ideal. Tribunals are likely to be ineffective when they neglect the interests
of state parties and instead make decisions based on moral ideals, or on the interests of
groups or individuals within a state, or on the interest of states that are not parties to the
dispute.21 Finally, the difference between interstate adjudication and transnational
adjudication is overdrawn: both involve states using a dispute resolution mechanism in
order to promote their joint interests.
The difference between our view and the conventional wisdom is centered on the
role of tribunal independence. A tribunal is independent when its members are
institutionally separated from the state parties. Tribunal members are independent, for
example, when they have fixed terms and salary protection, and the tribunal itself has, by
agreement, compulsory rather than consensual jurisdiction. The conventional wisdom
holds that independence at the international level is, like independence at the domestic
level, the key to the international rule of law and the future success of formalized
international dispute resolution. We argue, by contrast, that independent tribunals pose a
danger to international cooperation because independent tribunals can render decisions
20
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that violate the interests of state parties. On our view, independence prevents
international tribunals from being effective.
Our view is influenced by the large political science and legal literature on the
politics of domestic judicial decisionmaking. It is now conventional wisdom that the
political views of judges influence their decisions (even if they do not necessarily fully
determine their decisions).22 A judge appointed by a Republican president is more likely
to rule in favor of industry in an environmental dispute than a judge appointed by a
Democratic president, for example. The possibility that international judges might
similarly be influenced by their ideological views or their political or national allegiances
is rarely discussed in the literature on international adjudication. If they are, states will be
reluctant to use international tribunals unless they have control over the judges.
Independence creates risks and costs that have not been adequately addressed in the
literature, which has focused on its benefits. We redress this imbalance.
Part I of this paper describes the history of international dispute resolution,
beginning with international arbitration and then moving forward to efforts after World
Wars I and II to create permanent international tribunals and to today’s attempts to
increase the number and authority of international courts. Part II discusses why states
resort to formalized adjudication to resolve disputes, and then examines what design
features of international tribunals make most sense in light of the reasons that states use
such courts. Part III analyzes data on the performance of international tribunals and
relates it to their design characteristics. Part IV addresses the counterexamples to our
thesis provided by the European experience. Part V concludes with some tentative
predictions about the future of international adjudication
Before we start, we should clarify our use of terms. By “tribunal,” we mean any
panel of individuals who are given the task of resolving a dispute between states on the
basis of international law. The tribunal’s job is that of “international adjudication” or
“third party dispute resolution.” A tribunal can be more or less dependent. A more
dependent tribunal is an “arbitrator”; a less dependent tribunal is a “court.” Dependency
is a continuous variable, and states set up tribunals in many places across the spectrum,
so we can speak of a tribunal with quasi-arbitrator or quasi-court characteristics. Our
usage does not line up perfectly with international usage,23 but we rely on it because
international usage is not internally consistent.
I. BACKGROUND
States in conflict can choose from a range of methods to resolve disputes short of
the use of force or coercive sanctions, including diplomacy, mediation or conciliation,
22
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arbitration, and adjudication.24 While the distinctions between these categories are not
sharp, international legal scholars traditionally distinguish arbitration and adjudication
from negotiation or mediation because in the former a formally binding decision is
reached according to a legal rule.25 Before any permanent courts were established, states
often relied on ad hoc arbitration. In the typical arbitration case, two states involved in a
dispute would each appoint a single arbitrator; the two arbitrators would then jointly
appoint a third; and the three arbitrators would together hear arguments and deliver a
judgment. International lawyers date the modern era of arbitration to the Jay Treaty of
1795.26 Since then, hundreds of arbitrations have occurred, and they continue to the
present day. For example, the currently operating Iran-U.S. claims tribunal, which was
created to hear and adjust claims for damages arising from the Iranian Revolution in
1979, falls within this tradition.27 Interstate arbitrations have concerned a wide range of
disputes, including controversies over borders, damage to property during wars and civil
disturbances, and collisions between ships at sea.
While different in many respects, international arbitration shares a key
characteristic with international judicial processes: reliance on third parties to resolve a
dispute between two states. Third party dispute resolution has many attractions: it
introduces (in theory) a neutral body to a dispute, one whose views are not colored by
interest or passion.28 Arbitration involves the third party in the most limited way possible:
an arbitral panel is set up to resolve only one dispute or class of disputes, and it follows
an ad hoc set of procedural and substantive laws that remain within the control of the
parties. Arbitration’s main weakness is that the disputing states, whose interests and
passions are engaged, need not consent to a panel’s jurisdiction; nor need they comply
with its judgment, though they frequently do. A fully fledged international court has
different features, including: (1) compulsory jurisdiction—the court would have
automatic jurisdiction over certain classes of disputes; (2) a permanent judiciary whose
members do not depend on the disputing states for their appointment or salary; and (3)
regular procedures and substantive legal rules that would not be renegotiated from
dispute to dispute.29
The first tentative steps toward this ideal were taken at the turn of the nineteenth
century. The delegates to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 agreed to establish a
permanent arbitral body, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”).30 The PCA had the
modest goal of encouraging states to use arbitration; it did this by providing a set of
24
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procedures for choosing arbitrators from a group of people identified in advance as
potential candidates. However, parties did not use the PCA as much as its advocates
hoped, and it went into desuetude.31
The next step was the establishment of the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ), which, along with the League of Nations, was supposed to maintain
international order after World War I.32 The PCIJ’s innovation was an authentic panel of
judges, who served for fixed terms, and so in theory would be at least partly independent
of the influence of states. In addition, states could submit to compulsory jurisdiction by
making unilateral declarations, and many did. In other ways, however, the PCIJ lacked
independence, and could be and was ignored. Its failure set the stage for the International
Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the United Nations, which continued in 1946 from
where the PCIJ left off.33 The compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ has been more
significant than the compulsory jurisdiction of the PICJ. As we will discuss, compliance
with ICJ judgments has been more than occasional, although not routine.
At roughly the same time that the ICJ began its operations, drafters were putting
the finishing touches on GATT, a legal framework for international trade that eventually
resulted in a relatively systematic form of arbitration. After several decades of operation,
during which 298 cases were decided, the GATT arbitration system gave way to the more
court-like dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO in 1995. Unlike standard
arbitration systems like GATT’s, the DSM had compulsory jurisdiction, and states would
(as a practical matter) be unable to refuse consent to the creation of tribunals and their
adjudication of a dispute. As of 2000, 213 WTO cases had been initiated.
Starting in the 1950s, several regional courts were created. The European Court of
Justice (1952) adjudicates disputes arising under European law.34 The European Court of
Human Rights (1959) adjudicates disputes involving the 1950 European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.35 The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (1979) hears cases involving the 1969 American Convention on Human
Rights.36 There are only the best known regional courts; others deal with human rights
and commercial relationships in other parts of the world.
Another important development was the creation of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 1996, which has jurisdiction over a range of maritime
disputes governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
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(UNCLOS).37 It has compulsory jurisdiction and an independent, permanent group of
judges. Another area of growth in international adjudication has been in the area of war
crimes. The Nuremberg tribunal after World War II was followed, after a long hiatus, by
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (1993) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994).38 All three of these tribunals were established by
the parties after the disputed behavior occurred. The drafters of the Rome Statute of 1998
aspired to turn these episodic judicial interventions into a permanent court, the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which would be open to proceedings brought by a
regular prosecutor.39 This system would be the most independent to date; it would have
compulsory jurisdiction, independent judges, and a prosecutor with the authority (with
certain exceptions) to bring cases against defendants. It has not yet begun to hear cases.
In this mass of detail we can identify two trends. First, international tribunals have
become more formally powerful over time. Compulsory jurisdiction has become more
common, and the judiciaries have become more independent of the states that establish
them. Second, international tribunals have become more diverse and specialized.
Contrary to some expectations, the world has not moved toward a single judicial system
comparable to a domestic hierarchical judiciary; instead, jurisdiction is parceled out to
coequal institutions, with no higher appellate authority to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts.40
These developments raise important questions. How do international courts work?
Why do states create them and yield jurisdiction to them? Why do states obey them, if
they do? How can international courts be improved? What explains their popularity and
their fragmentation? As we noted in the introduction, the conventional wisdom is that the
effectiveness of an international court or tribunal is correlated with its independence and,
in general, with the degree to which it has the attributes of a domestic court.
It is understandable that recent scholarship has made the connection between the
effectiveness of a tribunal and the independence of its members. A distinctive feature of
domestic courts in advanced countries is their separation from politics. Even if they are
not completely immune to political influence, they are less prone to manipulation by
elected officials than ordinary political institutions are. Domestic courts are, in a word,
37
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independent; and conventional wisdom holds that the independence of courts is an
important factor that distinguishes successful market-based liberal democracies from
authoritarian countries and failed democracies in which corruption is the norm and
markets are weak.41 International legal scholars have transferred this logic from the
domestic arena to the international arena. They argue that when international tribunals are
dependent on the good will of particular states, their judges will be regarded as
“political,” as tools of the various parties, and not as “legitimate.”42 Legitimacy is
greatest when international judges have independence comparable to that of domestic
judges. Independence exists when judges have fixed terms and are not appointed by the
parties of a dispute; when the judges are not, or not necessarily, the nationals of a state
party to the dispute; when the judges observe regular, predetermined rules of procedure;
and when precedent and other legal conventions are observed. In addition, it is necessary
that jurisdiction be compulsory; otherwise, states will deny jurisdiction of a court when
they believe that they are likely to lose. This conventional wisdom has much intuitive
appeal, and some empirical support. Intuitively, we think that domestic courts are more
successful when judges are independent; that, anyway, is the American experience.43 In
addition, the most successful supranational court is the ECJ, and that court is relatively
independent. And states, apparently acknowledging the force of these observations, have
invented new tribunals, such as the WTO and ICC, which are more independent than
older tribunals.
However, the conventional wisdom overlooks the profound differences between
the settings in which domestic and international courts operate. Domestic courts play
their role within a political system thick with institutions, including a powerful executive
that has a monopoly of force and a legislature that enacts rules binding on all citizens.
Domestic courts are usually unified, with a powerful supreme court at the apex of the
hierarchy, within a legal system that has universal scope within a nation-state’s territorial
boundaries. In addition, the political system in any functioning state reflects a settlement
between competing groups, and has their loyalty. By contrast, international tribunals do
not operate as a part of a coherent and unified world government. They exist in an
interstitial legal system that lacks a hierarchy, a routine legislative mechanism that would
allow for centralized change, and an enforcement mechanism. International tribunals are
more like domestic arbitrators than domestic courts because nothing prevents disputants
from ignoring them if they do not believe that submitting to tribunals serves their interest.
To understand the significance of these differences, imagine that any country—
say, the United States—had a court system but lacked an executive and a legislature.
People bring their disputes to the courts, but there is no executive to enforce a judgment,

41
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nor do the courts have their own enforcement personnel.44 The courts enforce only
agreements between people, and customs or conventions. The customs or conventions are
determined by the courts, and if people disagree, they cannot appeal to a legislature to
change the law because no legislature exists. Although we might imagine that some
citizens would occasionally use courts to resolve private disputes, it is hard to believe that
courts would have much power and legitimacy; and, historically, the judicial function of
kings and rulers rarely emerged prior to the other powers of government; it arose
simultaneously or (as an independent institution) afterwards.
The international setting is different, to be sure. There are fewer states in the
world than people in any country; and it is possible that reputation can provide a means
for enforcement, as we discuss below. Still, we think that until the evidence shows to the
contrary, one should interpret the activities of international adjudicators with caution, and
should be skeptical of the claim that states would submit disputes to judges over whom
they have no influence. Independent judges are tolerated in domestic settings because
citizens who become judges share most of the values and expectations of the political
community, and when they do not, there is enough of a political consensus that they can
be removed, deprived of funds, or regulated (through changes in jurisdiction, the
modification of the laws that they enforce, and appointment of new judges). Trial judges
are controlled by appellate and supreme court justices, who are usually integrated into the
political community. However, there is no such political community at the international
level.
II. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A. Why States Use International Tribunals
International tribunals are modeled on domestic courts, and therefore resemble
them in many ways. But they exist in an entirely different institutional setting. Domestic
courts apply laws that have been created by legislatures; international tribunals do not.
International tribunals enforce treaties that in most cases were ratified by governments
that no longer exist, and customary international law that is frequently held to constrain
states that played no role in its creation. Although domestic courts also enforce laws that
a current government does not approve, and ancient constitutional provisions that no one
likes anymore, they face significant constraints. Governments can change laws that no
longer enjoy widespread support. By contrast, international law is quite difficult to
change. As there is no legislative body operating by majority rule, something like a
consensus is necessary for international law to change. In addition, international law has
no democratic pedigree: its validity does not turn on whether the states that create them
are democracies or autocracies. Finally, there is no enforcement mechanism: states that
fail to comply with a judgment, or to show up in court, do not have to worry about being
thrown in jail.
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These characteristics of international tribunals raise several questions. If
defendants do not have to comply with a judgment, why would they? If they do not, why
would other states ever resort to an international tribunal to resolve an international
dispute? And if a state that refuses to comply with a judgment incurs some cost like an
injury to its reputation, why would it ever consent to appear before the court in the first
place? Any theory of international adjudication must answer these questions.
We argue that tribunals can benefit states that seek to cooperate with each other
by providing relatively neutral information about the facts and law when disputes arise.
This occurs in two settings. First, tribunals may play a role in producing information of
value to states that have treaty disputes. States come into conflict when they take actions
that violate, or appear to violate, prior treaties. Tribunals can help resolve the conflict by
discovering and revealing information about the meaning of the agreement and the nature
of the allegedly infringing action. Second, when states come into conflict over
conventions or customs governing the division of global resources, tribunals can discover
facts, and help develop new rules or apply existing rules to new or unanticipated
circumstances.45
1. Information Disclosure in Treaty Disputes
States frequently enter treaties. Many treaties create obligations with which states
comply despite the absence of a centralized enforcement mechanism in the international
legal system. States, however, cannot prepare for all future contingencies or anticipate all
changed circumstances, nor will they always have access to expert information needed to
resolve disputes about the meaning of the treaty or its application. In such situations, third
parties can contribute to the resolution of treaty disputes by providing information about
the facts or the meaning of ambiguous treaty terms.
Consider a treaty that clarifies a border between state A and state B. Prior to
ratification of the treaty, the two states advanced conflicting claims over the same
territory. The treaty resolves these claims by, say, stating that henceforth the border
follows a river. Each state might obey the treaty—although it will not necessarily obey
the treaty. Suppose that each state covets territory on the other side of the river as well as
wanting to hold onto the territory on its own side of the river. Although state A would be
better off if it had some of B’s territory, it also knows that if it tries to grab that territory,
45
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B will defend it with military force and perhaps retaliate as well by attacking the territory
on A’s side of the river. Similarly, B knows that if it tries to grab some of A’s territory, A
will retaliate.
The strategic problem has the structure of the familiar prisoner’s dilemma; and the
solution is the mutual threat to retaliate against the state that violates the border. Each
state “cooperates” by keeping to its own side of the border; each state “cheats” by
sending forces across the border. Although a state does best by cheating while the other
state cooperates, it anticipates that this would never happen: if it cheats, the other state
will respond in kind. Thus, the fear of retaliation keeps both states on their own side of
the border, so long as the original balance of power that produced the treaty remains
roughly intact.46 The international agreement formalizes cooperation between states A
and B that allows them to escape the prisoner’s dilemma.47
So far we have explained how a treaty can be self-enforcing without relying on an
international tribunal. To understand the role of a tribunal, one must complicate the story.
It may be the case that the application of a treaty to the facts will be ambiguous, either
because the treaty is ambiguous or the facts are unclear. If each state has different beliefs
about the meaning of the treaty or about the facts, then they will have different
interpretations of their obligations under the treaty. In such a case, an impasse can occur.
Tribunals can serve as a device to resolve the impasse by providing a neutral judgment
about the law and the facts.
To make the discussion more concrete, consider the Chamizal Tract case, an
arbitration that was established to resolve a border dispute between the United States and
Mexico.48 After the Mexican-American War of 1848, the United States and Mexico
agreed that the border between them would follow the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers.49
Rivers make good borders because they are easy to observe, so it is clear when a border
incursion occurs. The problem is that the course of a river can move. The course can shift
slowly, as the current erodes one bank and deposits alluvium on the other bank. And the
course of a river can move quickly: after a flood the channel may be miles away from its
old location. This is called avulsion.50 Treaties between the United States and Mexico
stated that the border would shift with the river as long as the shift was due to erosion,
but that the border would remain in place when the course of the river shifted as a result
of avulsion.51
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In 1864, the Rio Grande flooded; when the floodwaters receded, the course of the
Rio Grande was farther south than it had been at the end of the Mexican-American War.
Because of a lack of records, it was not clear where the Rio Grande had been before the
flood. One possibility was that it was at or near its original location at the time of the
treaty. Another possibility was that the river had shifted gradually through erosion to its
location after the flood, or nearby. The Chamizal tract lay between these two positions.
Both the United States and Mexico claimed title to the whole tract.
Mexico and the U.S. had a disagreement about the application of the treaty. The
original location of the Rio Grande was unknown, and so the amount of movement that
resulted from erosion versus avulsion was unclear, and the treaty was silent about how to
handle such a contingency. Suppose that each state had its own scientific experts, and
these experts provided judgments about the pre-flood location of the river that favored
their own governments. Then there is no clear “cooperative” move without the
participation of a neutral third-party. A neutral tribunal could listen to the scientific and
legal experts on both sides, and then provide its own judgment about the meaning of the
treaty and the facts since its ratification. If the tribunal acts neutrally, then the information
it produces will be better than either side’s independent information—the tribunal
benefits from hearing from the experts on both sides—and the increased information then
makes clear what costs or benefits would result from taking certain actions. In this case,
the loser’s cooperative move is to comply with the judgment. If the tribunal, for example,
concludes that the present course of the river resulted from avulsion, then the cooperative
move is to treat the old location as the border; otherwise, the cooperative move is to treat
the new location as the border.
One might ask why the states could not resolve the dispute without the tribunal.
Each state could make its own scientists available to the other, and the scientists as a
group could resolve their differences. There would be no need for a third-party arbitrator
or adjudicator. This can and does happen. But there are problems of strategic behavior.
One state might withhold some information (for example, old land title records) that
would favor the other side. Or it could withhold some scientific studies that reveal
aspects of the river’s prior course. Or it could conceal records of the treaty negotiations
that might shed light upon an ambiguous treaty provision. The tribunal can, if given the
right powers, overcome these problems by hiring its own scientists, conducting its own
research, demanding records from either side, and so forth.
The tribunal’s function is to provide information. If the information is good, the
states will comply with the tribunal’s judgment for the same reason that they were willing
to cooperate when there was no ambiguity: to avoid retaliation. To be sure, the states
might not comply with the tribunal’s judgment; if the judgment is biased, or extreme, or a
state’s interests have changed in the meantime, then compliance will not necessarily
occur.52 But if the states believe that the tribunal is neutral, their interests remain
52
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constant, and the distribution of power between the states has not shifted, then they have
roughly the same incentive to comply with the judgment of the tribunal as they did when
they made the original agreement to cooperate.
It is important to understand what it means to say that the tribunal serves the
states’ interests. We mean ex ante interests. Ex post—after the dispute begins—only one
state can win, and the tribunal cannot please both states by declaring that both are
winners. But think of the tribunal as a response to the problem of treaty interpretation.
When the U.S. and Mexico signed the treaty (actually, treaties) resolving their border
dispute, they could not write every contingency into the treaty. One can imagine the
jointly value-maximizing treaty that allocates obligations for all contingencies, just as we
can imagine a contract that allocates obligations for every possible contingency.53 Just as
parties cannot describe all contingencies in their contracts, states cannot describe all
contingencies in their treaties. Just as a domestic court can reduce the transaction costs of
writing contracts by enforcing the hypothetical optimal contract, an arbitrator can reduce
the transaction costs of writing treaties by enforcing the hypothetical optimal treaty. Such
a judgment will meet with compliance as long as the losing state seeks to maintain a
reputation for complying with treaties, or to maintain a cooperative relationship with the
other state.
In sum, there are two important assumptions that make international adjudication
possible. First, the states can create and divide a surplus—in our hypothetical case,
dividing a disputed piece of territory without resort to a destructive war—only by
cooperation, and the present value of the payoffs from continued cooperation exceeds the
short-term gains from cheating. Second, states have imperfect information about whether
an action is consistent with a treaty, and the tribunal can reveal information about
whether the action is consistent with the treaty.
2. Information Disclosure in Customary International Law Disputes
States frequently come into conflict in ways that are not governed by treaties, and
when they do so, they invoke what is variously called custom, convention, or customary
international law. Customary international law is typically defined as custom that states
follow from a sense of legal obligation; more helpfully, it can be thought of as valuegenerating patterns of behavior that states have acquiesced in. When states otherwise
inclined to comply with customary international law come into conflict, they are
sometimes willing to resolve their conflict by appealing to customary international law.
When the law or the underlying facts are ambiguous or hidden, international adjudication
may help resolve the dispute.
We can give this theory more context by examining the customary international
law governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty.54 In prior centuries, western
nations considered much of the world “unoccupied”—that is, not controlled by powerful
53
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states. States would obtain sovereignty over these areas by “discovering” them and then
announcing their claim to the rest of the world. Although states frequently fought over
newly discovered territory, a convention arose through which states would respect each
other’s prior claims as long as these claims conformed to an always shifting and
frequently ambiguous set of rules. These rules governed such issues as: how a claim
would be made—did the discovering state need to plant a flag, set up a police station, or
just sail by the territory in question? How far could sovereignty extend—could the
discovering state claim an entire continent by planting a flag on a corner of it?55
We refer to these rules as conventions. There are various theories about how such
conventions could evolve.56 We do not have the space to discuss the general theories, but
the basic idea in the present context is that when there is plenty of land, states do better—
they come into less conflict while still obtaining territory—by respecting old claims and
searching for unclaimed territory, than by contesting old claims while leaving unclaimed
territory empty. The strategic problem is one of coordination, and once enough states
adopt the strategy of respecting old claims, no state can benefit from deviating from this
strategy, and the conventions are self-enforcing.
So far, we have not needed tribunals. But tribunals can have a role in this game.
Suppose that two states disagree about two things: (1) the scope of existing conventions;
and (2) the facts regarding the states’ compliance with the conventions. The first
disagreement can arise because conventions evolve in a decentralized way as states
independently adjust their strategies in response to developments in technology or
changes in the environment, and states have different sources of information about what
conventions are stable and value-maximizing. The second disagreement can arise because
states have different sources of information about what they have done in the past.
As an example, consider the Island of Palmas Case.57 This dispute involved
claims by the United States and Holland over an island between the Philippines, an
American colony at the time, and some Dutch possessions. The United States claimed the
island through a treaty with Spain, which had discovered the island many centuries
earlier. Holland claimed that it had exerted control over the island in the meantime and
that Spain had not. The legal issue was whether the Spanish discovery was enough to
give Spain title to the island, and hence the United States, or whether Spain forfeited
sovereignty to Holland by failing to exercise control over the island. The arbitrator held
in favor of Holland on the ground that territorial sovereignty must be maintained through
a display of authority.
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The arbitrator did two things. He decided whether the law required continuous
control, and he decided whether Spain exerted continuous control. His first decision was
apparently based on the assumption that, in the absence of continuous control, conflict
between states over territory would be more common. His second decision was based on
an assessment of the facts. Thus, on both questions the arbitrator was revealing
information that one or both states did not have. On the former question, the arbitrator
brought to bear expert knowledge on the likely effects of different rules concerning the
acquisition of territorial sovereignty, and chose the one that reduced the system-wide
costs that would have resulted from more conflict.58 On the latter question, he was able to
reveal information by evaluating the factual claims made by both sides of the dispute.
As with treaty disputes, we might again ask why the states needed the tribunal.
Couldn’t they have consulted their own historians and legal experts, and come to the
same conclusion? The answer is that each state has only partial information, and they also
have strategic incentives to withhold information that might benefit the other state. The
tribunal can collect information, and provide a neutral judgment. As in the case of
treaties, the judgment is, in effect, a disclosure of information, and if the tribunal is
competent and neutral, and the states’ payoffs have not changed sufficiently since the
establishment of the tribunal, the states have an incentive to comply with the judgment.
3. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Our two arguments are versions of one idea. When states interact with each other
repeatedly over time, they can cooperate. Their cooperation can result from explicit
agreements (treaties) or the unilateral adoption of strategies that permit reciprocal, valuegenerating behavior (convention or customary international law). Tribunals have a
similar role in the two models. In the model of treaties, tribunals are used to discover and
reveal information about each state’s compliance with its treaty obligations. In the model
of convention, tribunals are used to reveal each state’s compliance with a convention.
Tribunals can be effective only if the state that loses is (usually) willing to comply with
the judgment. If the loser is the defendant, then it pays reparations or takes any other
action required by the tribunal. If the loser is the complainant, then it drops its claim
against the defendant, and does not pursue it any further through other forums, diplomatic
channels, or the threat of force.
Why would the loser comply with the judgment? The cost of complying with the
judgment—paying reparations, yielding territory, and so forth—provides an incentive to
violate the judgment. But there is a benefit from compliance as well. A state that
complies retains the option to rely on tribunals in the future, for a state that routinely
violated judgments would not credibly be able to propose international adjudication as a
way of resolving a dispute with another state. Thus, a state will comply with the
judgment if the cost of compliance is less than the future benefits of continued use of
adjudication. The future benefits of adjudication can be high only if the tribunal performs
well—and this means resolving the dispute neutrally as between the disputing states; that
58
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is, interpreting the treaty or convention in a way that maximizes its (ex ante) value to the
two parties.59 There may be a range of possible outcomes that the states would jointly
accept: jargon refers to this range as the “win set” between the two states’ reservation
prices, that is, the minimum they will accept as an alternative to impasse or war. States
therefore will use international adjudication only if the tribunal, over time, provides an
accurate (or politically sensitive) judgment (that is, a judgment within the win set). If the
tribunal violates its instructions and/or allows the personal preferences, ideological
commitments, or national loyalties of its members to influence the judgment too much,
then compliance might not occur. States will comply with judgments, and will use
tribunals in the first place, only if they believe that the judgments will be unbiased.60
Under what conditions will the tribunal render an unbiased decision? Let us
suppose that the tribunal consists of a single individual. We might fear that each state will
offer to bribe the tribunal to provide a judgment in its favor. The bribe could be cash, but
it could be something subtler. Either state might promise to support the adjudicator’s
reappointment to the tribunal or appointment to some other international body after the
case is over. Or, even if the states do not make the promise explicitly, it might be in either
state’s interest to provide benefits to judges or arbitrators who have ruled in their favor in
the past. Thus, judges and arbitrators know that if they rule in favor of their own state or
the state that appoints them, they can expect lucrative positions or other forms of career
advancement. Finally, when a judge or arbitrator is a national of one state, or the national
of a friend of one state, the implicit bribe might take the form of a domestic political
position or other benefit. In sum, we might suppose that the tribunal—or the various
members—will sell the judgment to the higher bidder.
If tribunals regularly did this, however, states would never use them. The state
that expects to lose the “auction” for the judges’ votes will refuse to consent to the
tribunal in the first place. To obtain business, tribunals must establish a reputation for
neutrality. They can do this initially by drawing their members from the pool of
individuals who occupy relevant positions of trust—domestic judges, for example—and
then by turning down bribes and rendering neutral judgments. In short, arbitrators or
judges have an incentive to rule within the range of outcomes acceptable to the states—in
other words, acting according to their instructions or according to the ex ante boundaries
of cooperation—because such decisions make it more likely that they will be used again.
The tribunal’s incentives to render an unbiased judgment are reputational. If it renders a
biased judgment, then the losing state might not comply with it. Although other states
might infer that the loser is at fault, and not the tribunal made a poor judgment, if enough
noncompliance occurs, then other states will eventually assume that the tribunal is biased
or defective and refuse to use it themselves.
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In sum, third party dispute resolution is possible when:
1. Two (or more) states gain from cooperation because they expect to interact in
the future and place sufficient weight on payoffs from future cooperation on the
same issue.
2. A dispute arises as a result of asymmetric information: each state has private
information about its own past actions or different beliefs about the meaning of a
treaty or convention.
3. The tribunal has the right kind of expertise or information, or the ability to
generate information, and it is sufficiently unbiased, because (a) it has sufficient
business; (b) its decisionmakers care about future payoffs; and (c) its
decisionmakers do not have strong ideological or national preferences that result
in biased outcomes.
But we need to say more about how the third party dispute resolution mechanism
can be designed to ensure that it is informed and unbiased. This is the subject of the next
section.
B. The Design of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
States do not need a tribunal if the law and the facts are clear enough—when the
treaty or convention clearly governs the dispute, and the states have the same information
about the relevant facts, there is nothing a tribunal can contribute to the resolution of the
dispute. When these conditions are not met, the question is how states can avoid conflict
by relying on tribunals. In this section, we discuss different institutional designs and how
they relate to the purposes served by international adjudication discussed above.
1. The Single Arbitrator
The simplest tribunal is a single person.61 The two states cannot resolve the
dispute, but they can agree on appointing a person to resolve the dispute. This might
seem like a paradox. States that cannot agree on whether a treaty was violated would
seem unlikely to agree on the appointment of a person to decide the same question.
However, the paradox is only superficial. Suppose that the states have better information
about the proposed arbitrator than they do about the law or facts of the dispute. To agree
on an arbitrator, the states need to know that the individual is neutral and has the relevant
expertise. To settle the dispute, without seeking the intervention of a third party, states
need to have the same information about the underlying facts and agree on the
interpretation of a treaty or convention. As long as there are cases in which the first
condition is met and the second is unmet, states will sometimes agree on an arbitrator
when they cannot otherwise settle the dispute.
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Frequently, the arbitrator is the head, or some other important official, of a state
that has friendly relations with the disputing states. For example, Czar Alexander of
Russia arbitrated a claim arising from a disputed provision in the Treaty of Ghent which
ended the War of 1812 between Britain and the U.S.62 Because the arbitrator knows that
he will have to deal with both states in the future, he does not want to risk alienating
either of them, as this may create suspicion or provoke retaliation. Thus, the arbitrator has
an incentive to render a neutral judgment.
A neutral and expert arbitrator is always an appealing means for resolving a
dispute. But it is not always the case that such an arbitrator exists, or can be identified,
and there is always the risk that the arbitrator who is chosen may turn out to be biased or
incompetent. In deciding whether to go to arbitration, each state weighs the benefits
(avoidance of conflict) against the costs (a biased outcome). On the cost side, a biased
outcome will injure one state, and it may not be willing to comply with the judgment. The
same is true when the arbitrator simply errs. The state harmed by the error may not
comply with the judgment. Ex ante, the parties will avoid arbitration, and rely on
diplomacy backed by the threat of war, if they cannot find, and agree on, an arbitrator
who is sufficiently likely to be neutral and expert.
2. Three (or More) Arbitrators
With the single-arbitrator configuration as background, we can understand the
three-arbitrator configuration. Under this system, each state appoints one arbitrator; then
the two state arbitrators jointly appoint a third arbitrator. The states expect their
appointees to represent their interests, but expect the third arbitrator to be neutral. The
most plausible explanation for this approach is that the “states”—that is, the foreign
minister or other official who addresses international conflicts—do not know much about
the nature of the dispute, and the qualifications of potential neutral arbitrators. To solve
this problem, states delegate to an appointee the power to agree on a neutral tie-breaker.
The appointee is an agent; his task is to ensure that the third arbitrator is not biased in
favor of the other side. If both appointees have this task, and they perform their tasks
well, then the third arbitrator will be neutral as between the states.
The problem is that whenever a principal relies on an agent, it incurs the risk that
the agent will perform inadequately. If the state’s own ministers do not choose the single
neutral arbitrator, but instead rely on their appointee to pick a third arbitrator, they take
the chance that the appointee will agree to the selection of an arbitrator biased against the
state. An appointee might be outwitted by the arbitrator on the other side, or he might
take insufficient care in choosing the third arbitrator. This is the problem of agency slack.
Because of agency slack, it is more likely that a three arbitrator tribunal will render a
judgment that is biased (or erroneous) than a one arbitrator tribunal will. If the bias is
high enough, it could result in judgments that are outside the win set and therefore
incapable of procuring compliance. For that reason, single arbitrator tribunals should
obtain a higher level of compliance than three arbitrator tribunals will, holding constant
the level of expertise. But this is not to say that three arbitrator tribunals are useless.
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States will use them when they cannot find a single neutral and informed arbitrator, and
prefer the three party system to the alternative—diplomacy, impasse, and possible
conflict or war.
3. From Arbitration to Courts
One problem with arbitration is that the decisionmakers are picked anew each
time. Although states will find themselves choosing from a relatively small pool of
experienced experts, it is difficult (though not impossible) for a jurisprudence to develop.
States maintain control over the arbitration by stipulating the question for the arbitrator to
answer; but by the same token they lose the benefit of being able to rely on a coherent set
of rules emerging from the repeated examination of similar issues by a discrete, relatively
permanent group of people—a proper judiciary. This forces states to incur the additional
cost of establishing new rules for each dispute, and creates unpredictability.
Some international tribunals have sought to solve this problem without adopting
all of the features of true courts. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, for example, was,
in essence, a pool of arbitrators-in-waiting. It was thought that by supplying a ready pool
of arbitrators, the PCA would make arbitration more attractive. But if parties could
choose among the pool of PCA arbitrators, they could also decline to use the system. It
thus did not solve the problem. To enhance the value of international adjudication, one
needed not only a pool of potential adjudicators, but a group of actual adjudicators, whom
states would be required to use. Only in this way might a coherent jurisprudence arise.
But now the question is, how can states be compelled to bring their disputes to a
particular tribunal? What prevents a state from simply refusing to appear before the
tribunal in response to a suit by another state? The legal answer is compulsory
jurisdiction: once a state submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal, it cannot withdraw
without violating international law except by giving substantial notice.
Rational states will not submit to compulsory jurisdiction unless they believe that
they will benefit from it. The benefit is the right to force other states to appear;63 but the
cost is that they might be forced to appear as defendants, against their wishes. One
necessary condition for the benefits to exceed the costs is that the international law over
which the court has jurisdiction produces a net benefit for all states that are involved—
and this is certainly possible, especially for treaties that states voluntarily enter. The other
condition, which is far more difficult, is the neutrality of the tribunal. If jurisdiction is
compulsory, then states cannot withhold consent to a tribunal whose members they do not
trust. If the tribunal is to have jurisdiction over the disputes of many different states, then
it will have to consist of judges from diverse states, and not just those whom two states
involved in a dispute consent to, as in the case of arbitration.
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The inability of disputing states to veto tribunals or panels that they do not trust is
the first characteristic of the independent tribunal. At this point, the question arises, if
judges no longer need to please particular states in order to obtain repeat business, why
should they ensure that their judgment falls within the win set of the two states that
happen to have a dispute? The judges might indulge personal biases; or they might try to
develop the law in a way that benefits all states, including states that are not parties to the
dispute. The state parties to the dispute will be unhappy if the judgment does not match
their ex ante interests and positions, and instead benefits uninvolved states through its
influence on the development of the law. If this becomes the general practice, then states
will refuse to consent to the jurisdiction of an independent tribunal, or will eventually
withdraw their consent or refuse to comply with its judgments.64
Reflecting this concern, tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction are often staffed
with nationals from the states subject to their jurisdiction, and usually a state party will
have the right to insist that one of the judges on a panel be a national. But this is not the
same as the three arbitrator case, where the national’s consent to a neutral third arbitrator
was needed before the arbitration could go forward. In the court systems, the national can
vote in favor of the state party but can always be outvoted by judges who have no
connection with the state party.
In sum, states may achieve practical advantages by establishing relatively
independent tribunals. These tribunals, unlike classic arbitration panels, can develop an
institutional memory, are available at the time of a dispute, and need not be created anew.
These advantages could outweigh the costs of independence, but they might not: this is
an empirical question.
There is another important reason why states might create independent tribunals.
Ordinary citizens and elected officials have from time to time sought to replace war with
adjudication. This powerful ideal can have great attraction, especially after times of
conflict, and politicians either believe that the ideal can be achieved or are rewarded by
constituents who have the same hope. The great international courts have all followed
great conflicts: the PCIJ after World War I; the ICJ after World War II. The flurry of
tribunal-making in the 1990s followed the end of the Cold War. All of these tribunals
were created in a heady atmosphere of fear that the earlier conflict would recur mixed
with hope that conflict could be replaced with adjudication. The question is whether
tribunals created in such an atmosphere can endure the assaults of normal international
politics once the temporary unity among the victors fades.
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4. Measuring Independence
A tribunal can be more or less independent of the two states that happen to appear
before it at a given time.65 At one extreme, the single arbitrator is heavily dependent: he
is jointly chosen by the two states, and if one or both of the states are unhappy with his
judgment, they may never use him again (or they may even retaliate against him in other
ways). At the other extreme is the permanent judicial body: it is appointed in advance and
has compulsory jurisdiction. The advantage of the independent tribunal is that its
jurisdiction cannot easily be evaded by a state that has violated its obligations, it has a
more predictable body of law to apply, and it can quickly render a judgment. Its
disadvantage is that it is less likely to be neutral as between the two states. Judges on the
body cannot be easily disciplined if they allow ideology, sentiment, or their own interests
or national loyalties, to influence their decisions.
Table 1: Tribunal Independence
Characteristic

Dependent

Independent

Term

Duration of the Dispute

Permanent

Jurisdiction

Dispute/Treaty

Area of Law

Iinitiation

Victim

Independent Party

Number of States

Bilateral

Multilateral/Intervention Right

State Consent to Jurisdiction

After Dispute Occurs

Before Dispute Occurs

Source of Panel Members

Chosen by States in Dispute

Chosen by Nonparty States, Other Third
Party

Table 1 contains the factors we have mentioned, and adds a few more. Starting
with the first row, a dependent tribunal lasts only as long as the dispute; an independent
tribunal is permanent. (Although its members are replaced after fixed terms, these terms
do not coincide with any particular dispute.) A dependent tribunal has only the
jurisdiction that the disputing parties give it; an independent tribunal has fixed
jurisdiction over an area of law such as trade. A dependent tribunal can be invoked only
by the consent of the states after a dispute; an independent tribunal can be invoked by a
third party such as a prosecutor (like the ICC). A dependent tribunal resolves a dispute
only between two states or sometimes a small number; an independent tribunal is
available to a large number of states, the states that are party to the treaty that created it;
and an affected state that is not a part of the initial dispute may have a right to intervene.
A dependent tribunal comes into existence after the dispute arises, and only with the
consent of the disputing states; an independent tribunal must also trace its existence to
consent, but the consent comes earlier, before the dispute, when the states enter into a
treaty or declare themselves subject to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and states cannot
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the tribunal without losing the ability to invoke it.
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Keohane and his coauthors also focus on independence. For their discussion, which has influenced ours,
see Keohane et al., supra note __, at 455-60. They also look at access and legal embededness, factors from
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Finally, the judges of a dependent tribunal are chosen by the disputing states; the judges
of an independent tribunal are appointed by state parties to the treaty that creates it but
these state parties do not have control over the judges who hear their case when a dispute
arises. Note that independence is a continuous variable, and the design of different
tribunals reflects a range of values.
In sum, independence is a measure of a tribunal member’s vulnerability to the
state that appoints him. Tribunals composed of dependent members have a strong
incentive to serve the joint interests of the disputing states. Tribunals composed of
independent members have a weaker incentive to serve those states’ interests, and are
more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives, or the interests of other states
to influence their judgments.
5. Implications
We can now draw together the threads. The conventional wisdom holds that a
tribunal’s effectiveness and independence are positively correlated. This hypothesis can
be falsified by showing that independent tribunals are less effective than dependent
tribunals. This is our main purpose. Our thesis is that effectiveness and independence are
uncorrelated. We will also argue that, if anything, the correlation is negative. However,
the evidence for the negative correlation is relatively weak. So our main conclusion is
that effectiveness and independence are most likely uncorrelated, but as between positive
and negative correlation, the evidence favors negative correlation.
To make this argument, we need to measure “effectiveness.” Unfortunately, this is
difficult. There are three possible measures.
First, one could look at compliance. A tribunal is effective if states comply with
its judgments. Compliance can be measured in terms of compliance rate: the number of
complied-with judgments divided by the total number of judgments. Conventional
wisdom holds that independent tribunals have a higher compliance rate than do
dependent tribunals.
One problem with this measure is that compliance can be hard to observe.
Sometimes, states comply with a judgment but only after a very long delay (years,
decades), and in the meantime conditions have changed. Should this kind of behavior
count as compliance? More serious, compliance rates are subject to selection effects.
States might submit politically sensitive cases to more effective tribunals and easier, less
sensitive cases to less effective tribunals. But then effective tribunals might have
compliance rates that are no better than those of weak tribunals—because of the nature of
the dispute, not because of the design of the tribunal.
Second, one could look at usage. If a tribunal is ineffective, states will stop using
it. Usage can be measured in gross terms or in more refined terms. One might look at the
number of states that use a tribunal, the number of cases, the number of cases per year,
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the number of cases per state per year, and so on, depending on the importance of a
precise measurement.66
A problem with this measure is usage can reflect other things aside from
effectiveness; for example, the importance of the area of international law that the
tribunal governs. If trade disputes are more important and numerous than maritime
disputes, then a less effective trade court might be used more often than an effective
maritime court. More serious, usage rates, like compliance rates, are subject so selection
effects. States might settle their disputes in the shadow of an effective court because they
can anticipate its judgment and compliance by the loser. If ineffective courts are
unpredictable, they might be used more often.
Third, one could look at the overall success of the treaty regime that established
the court. Consider trade again. The international trade system is supposed to enhance
international trade flows. Suppose that trade flows are at a given level, and that the
adjudication system is converted from a dependent tribunal to an independent tribunal.
Whether or not the new tribunal is used or complied with more often, a jump in trade
flows after this change would be a good indication of an effective court, everything else
equal. The problem is that everything else is never equal. Did international cooperation
increase after the ICJ was established? This kind of question is impossible to answer.
We will use all three measures of effectiveness in the next Part, but it is important
to keep in mind that they are all highly imperfect. One could make the case that selection
effects undermine any effort to find a causal relationship between independence and
effectiveness, at least for usage and compliance. If so, we can do no better than establish
our weak thesis—that there is no evidence for the conventional wisdom that independent
tribunals are more effective than dependent tribunals are.67
III. THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
In this Part, we examine various international tribunals for evidence that sheds
light on the relationship between independence and effectiveness. There are currently a
dozen or more international tribunals in existence. Some of these tribunals are regarded
as successes, others as failures. Some of these tribunals are “dependent,” in our technical
sense, others independent. Thus, we have the variation we need to test the conventional
wisdom that independent tribunals outperform dependent tribunals. We begin our
evaluation of the evidence with a discussion of the ad hoc arbitration system that
prospered during the nineteenth century. This system is not itself a “tribunal,” and
therefore comparing it to the later twentieth century tribunals is problematic. But
arbitration is the purest example of dependence, and so it provides a useful baseline
against which to evaluate the other tribunals.
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Cf. Keohane et al., supra note __, at 475. These usage statistics are misleading because they do not
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As we discuss below, however, there are some efforts to deal with selection problems in studies of GATT
and WTO.
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A. Arbitration
When states resolve disputes without the aid of a formal international court, they
often rely on various more informal mechanisms, including arbitration. Arbitration is as
old as diplomacy. It was practiced by the ancient Greeks, by feudal lords during the
middle ages, and by the leaders of the emerging European states in the early modern
period.68 Modern arbitration is conventionally dated to the Jay Treaty, which provided
that outstanding claims arising from the revolutionary war would be submitted to
arbitration. Arbitration became more common after the Napoleonic Wars and was
flourishing by the second half of the nineteenth century. It has continued to the present
day, even as more formal tribunals have sprung up and attracted disputes that once would
have been submitted to arbitration.
Arbitration comes in many forms, but in essence it involves the appointment of
one or more individuals to hear and resolve a dispute between two (or sometimes more
than two) states. Sometimes the states agree on a single arbitrator; more often, each state
appoints one (or more) arbitrators, and then these state-appointed arbitrators jointly
appoint an equal number of neutral arbitrators. The states instruct the arbitrators to decide
a usually narrow legal or factual issue. The arbitrators may invent their own rules of
procedure and evidence; frequently they draw on conventional or codified rules. All of
these characteristics are those of a highly dependent tribunal: the tribunal is appointed ex
post; only the disputing states can appear before it; and the tribunal lasts only as long as
necessary to resolve the disputes.
1. Ad Hoc International Arbitration
In order to get a feel for the popularity and effectiveness of arbitration, we
collected data on arbitrations from 1794 to 1989. Our source is a book by A.M. Stuyt,
who provides information on every arbitration during that period.69 We consider only
those arbitrations for which Stuyt provides the identities of both parties and the starting
date; for many but not all of the arbitrations he provides other important information,
including: the year of the judgment, whether the arbitration was performed by a
commission or by a head of state or other official; the nature of the dispute; the identity
of the winner; the judgment; and whether compliance occurred.
There were 467 arbitrations during the period, though many were closely related
or stemming from a single dispute. The frequency of arbitration rose gradually and
peaked in the decade before World War I. Table 2 provides the number of arbitrations by
twenty year period (excluding the last 10 years of the data set and arbitrations for which
no starting year was given). It shows that the absolute number of arbitrations increased
until World War I, and then never fully recovered. If we confine ourselves to arbitrations
involving two Great Powers or one Great Power and the United States,70 we can see that
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Jackson H. Ralston , International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno (2004).
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The Great Powers include Britain, Russia, France, Prussia (Germany after 1870), Italy after 1870, Japan
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even within this limited pool of states the rate of arbitration increased; thus, the increase
was not driven solely by growth in the number of independent states during the
nineteenth century. The failure of the arbitration rate to recover even after the end of
World War II may have been due to the rise of other dispute resolution mechanisms.
Table 2: Arbitrations by Twenty Year Periods71
Years

All States

1794–1819
1820–1839
1840–1859
1860–1879
1880–1899
1900–1919
1920–1939
1940–1959
1960–1979

23
9
29
48
116
101
80
18
16

Involving Two Great
Powers or U.S.
*
2
3
6
17
16
5
0
4

Note: 1900–1914, there were 86 arbitrations; 1915–1919, there were 5.
*No great power data.

Most arbitrations involved two states. The most common topics were, in order,
borders (90), personal claims (68), maritime seizures (36), arbitrary acts (29), treaty
interpretation (26), war damages (15), indemnity (12), mutual claims (12), civil
insurrection (11), and military action (8). These are Stuyt’s classifications, and are not
transparent, but they give one a sense of the landscape. Of the arbitrations for which this
information was given, 306 (about 2/3) involved a commission of three people or more,
and 145 involved a single arbitrator or mediator, typically a head of state. Commissions
were popular for civil insurrections, war damages, and personal claims; heads of state
were popular for arbitrary acts and maritime seizures.
It is well known that Britain and the United States were early champions of
arbitration, and the numbers bear out the conventional wisdom. But there are also some
surprises. Table 3 lists the main users of arbitration.

major maritime power throughout the nineteenth century, it seems appropriate to include it. See Norman
Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, at 213-23 (1992).
71
Compiled from Stuyt, supra note __.
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Table 3: Arbitration by State72
UK
USA
France
Germany
Chile
Italy
Peru
Venezuela
Mexico
Spain
Colombia
Portugal
Brazil
Netherlands
Ecuador
Austria
Argentina
Russia
Bolivia
Canada
China
Japan

116
106
81
50
33
32
29
24
20
20
19
18
16
15
13
11
11
9
8
8
5
4

The rough pattern that emerges is that large countries—not necessarily Great
Powers—use arbitration frequently, as one would expect; and that Latin American
countries have a special preference for arbitration. But there are problems of selection
bias. Large countries should use arbitration more often because they have more
interactions than small countries do. The Latin American countries are older than similar
smaller countries in Africa and Asia; they came into existence prior to the heyday of
arbitration in the early to mid nineteenth century. Still, it does appear that the Latin
American nations have relied on arbitration more than other states have, and the historical
evidence suggests that American influence played a role.73 There is little evidence that
democracy plays a role in the choice to arbitrate; many of the prominent users of
arbitration—Germany, Chile, Italy—were not democracies during the relevant periods.74
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74
Raymond claims that democracies choose arbitration more often than mediation, because arbitration is
more legalistic, and democracies care more for the rule of law. See Gregory A. Raymond, Democracies,
Disputes and Third-Party Intermediaries, 38 J. Conflict Res. 24 (1994). His regression, which uses the
Stuyt database, does show that pairs of democracies are more likely to use arbitration (that is,
“commissions”) than mediation (that is, “heads of state), but not that democracies are more likely to use
either of these procedures than an alternative like diplomacy or war. In addition, he interprets the head of
state cases as not involving legal judgments; this appears to be wrong. The one party cases seem to be
formal arbitrations.
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In the abstract, we cannot say that the usage of arbitration is high or low. But it is
telling that the popularity of arbitration increased steadily through the nineteenth century,
suggesting that states were pleased with the results. Usage can be measured in various
ways, as we discuss below. For now, it is useful for baseline purposes to observe that
arbitrated disputes peaked just prior to World War I at six per year. A more precise
measure—arbitrated disputes per state per year—is 0.06 for the period 1860-79, 0.15 for
the period 1880-1899, and 0.14 for the period 1900-1914.75 The significance of these
figures will become clearer when we compare tribunals in Part III.E.
As noted above, Stuyt provides data on compliance for some of the cases, but the
data are difficult to interpret. Of the 220 cases for which Stuyt provides compliance data,
he says that compliance occurred in 206 cases, for a very high 94 percent compliance
rate. However, Stuyt does not explain how he defined and measured compliance. Further,
it is possible that the cases with compliance information are a biased sample. If it is
harder to collect information about noncompliance than information about compliance,
then it could be that all or most of the 247 cases for which there is no information should
be treated as noncompliance cases. If the no information cases are cases of
noncompliance, the compliance rate is 44 percent.
We were able to run some regressions that shed light on our hypothesis. Recall
that about 2/3 of the cases involved a commission of three people or more; and about 1/3
involved a single person such as a head of state. In our terms, the single arbitrator is more
“dependent” than the commission because there is less agency slack. Therefore, we
predict that states are more likely to comply with the judgment of the single arbitrator
than with the judgment of the commission. Using the broader interpretation of Stuyt’s
data—where observations with no information about compliance are treated as cases of
no compliance—we find strong evidence for this hypothesis. With and without various
controls (participation of great powers, democracies, and year), the commission’s
judgment is less likely to meet with compliance, at or around the one percent level of
statistical significance (coefficient is around 0.7 with all controls) than the single
arbitrator’s judgment is. (See Table 4 for a tabulation.) However, if we exclude the no
information cases, the results, not surprisingly, disappear (and the sign is the other
direction, but not at a statistically significant level).76
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We used the numbers for arbitrations from Table 2. During both periods there were on average 38
independent states. Data for number of states per year are from the Correlates of War Project, available at
http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/dataset.html#States. The website contains the definition of states.
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Another interpretation is that commission arbitrations are less likely to produce judgments for which
compliance records are kept; a third is that states send more difficult cases to commissions; but these
interpretations seem unlikely. The head of state cases seem more sensitive, not less. But here is a reason for
doubting our results. It is plausible that the U.S. and the UK, as the chief proponents and users of
arbitration, kept better records of arbitration than other states did or were less likely to keep the results of
an arbitration secret. This is supported by the data. In 60 percent of the cases involving the U.S. or the UK,
there is information on compliance; for all other states, there is information in only 31 percent of the cases.
But if you just look at the U.S. or UK cases, then the compliance rate is higher (95 percent) rather than
lower. This suggests that no information cases should not be classified as no compliance cases.
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Table 4: Compliance with Commissions versus Individuals77
Commission
Individual
Total

No Compliance
192
71
263

Compliance
114
75
189

Total
306
146
452

It is probably wiser to treat arbitrations involving commissioners or heads of state
as a single class. Treating arbitration as a baseline against which to compare the more
formal tribunals, we have a compliance rate of 44 to 94 percent, and a usage rate of 0.14
disputes per states per year at its height at the turn of the nineteenth century.
2. A Recent Example: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was created in the aftermath of the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, and the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran by student
militants.78 The U.S. responded by freezing Iran’s assets. After negotiations through an
intermediary, Iran agreed to release the American hostages, the U.S. agreed to unfreeze
Iranian assets, and both states agreed to resolve outstanding commercial and interstate
disputes through arbitration.79 As part of the agreement, the U.S. transferred a portion of
Iran’s assets to an account in a foreign bank, which was instructed to release those assets
as necessary to satisfy judgments issued by the Tribunal. The Tribunal began operation in
1981.80
The Tribunal has considerable resources, has decided many cases over the course
of more than two decades, and has generally experienced full compliance with its
decisions. For these reasons, one might think of the Tribunal as an authentic international
court, on a par with the ICJ. In fact, however, the Tribunal is an example of classic ad hoc
arbitration. The Tribunal was given a very specific jurisdiction over disputes between the
U.S. and Iran that existed prior to its creation. Its jurisdiction was thus clearly ex post.
The composition of the Tribunal followed the classic pattern. Each state appointed one
third of the judges (3 each) and these judges jointly appointed the “neutral” third. So
there were a total of 9 judges: 3 Americans, 3 Iranians, and 3 nationals from other states.
The judicial body was not permanent or continuing in the normal sense: it did not exist
before the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, and it will last only as long as is
necessary to resolve the claims that have been assigned to it. Third states have no right to
intervene in the proceedings. In sum, the Tribunal is highly dependent, similar to the
classic ad hoc arbitration system.
It is widely agreed that the Tribunal has been a success, and several objective
measures confirm this view. The agreement provided that parties had to file their claims
by January 1982. Approximately 3,800 claims were filed, and nearly all have been
77
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resolved.81 United States claimants have been awarded more than $2 billion, and Iranian
claimants have been awarded about $1 billion.
In sum, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal harks back to nineteenth century ad hoc
arbitrations that resolved a mass of (mainly) private claims that arose after a civil
disturbance in which a government was complicit. The pattern is the same: the two states
agree ex post to an ad hoc arbitration scheme, the arbitrators issue awards, and the awards
are paid. The independence of the tribunal is low and compliance is high.
B. The International Court of Justice
A striking contrast to the success of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal can be found at
the other end of the adjudicatory spectrum—the International Court of Justice. The ICJ
was created by a treaty, the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is
part of the Charter of the United Nations.82 It describes itself as the “principal judicial
organ of the United Nations,” and its function is to settle legal disputes under
international law that are submitted to it by states. It also may issue advisory opinions on
legal questions referred to it by a selected group of international organizations. The ICJ
replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice, which had been established in
1922, and the ICJ statute was based on the organizing statute of the PCIJ.83 The ICJ is a
permanent international organization whose existence is not dependent on the resolution
of any particular dispute.84
The ICJ is considered the model of a permanent international court. It has a
substantial administrative bureaucracy, a broad jurisdiction, and is considered by many to
have the final word on questions of international law. It is composed of 15 judges who
are selected by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, and serve terms of
nine years; no two judges are permitted from the same nation. One third of the seats come
open every three years, with the possibility of reappointment of judges whose terms have
expired. If a state party in a case does not have a judge of its nationality on the Court, it
may appoint an ad hoc judge of its choice for that case.85 According to the ICJ, the
General Assembly and the Security Council have sought to represent different regions
and legal traditions on the Court,86 but other sources make clear that powerful countries
control individual seats, so that the United States, for example, has always had a judge of
its nationality on the Court.87
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Only states may bring contentious (as opposed to advisory) cases. The Statute of
the ICJ gives the Court three types of jurisdiction.88 First, states may submit a dispute to
the Court by special, that is, ad hoc agreement: both states must agree to such a
submission. Second, a treaty may contain a jurisdictional clause that submits disputes
under the treaty to the ICJ for resolution. Many bilateral friendship, commerce, and
navigation treaties between the United States and other nations of the world contain such
a clause, as do some multilateral treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Consular
Rights. Third, states may declare consent to the “compulsory” jurisdiction of the Court;
this means that they agree to submit to the ICJ all international legal disputes with
another nation that has also accepted compulsory jurisdiction under similar conditions.
Today, approximately 64 nations have agreed to such jurisdiction.
The ICJ has many of the characteristics of an independent court: it is a permanent
institution with a continuous body of judges. However, its level of independence turns on
the type of jurisdiction. To the extent states use its ad hoc jurisdiction, the ICJ is
dependent. If states do not like the way that the ICJ resolves ad hoc disputes, they can
refrain from submitting future disputes to it, and the ICJ will lose business. If the ICJ
wants to maintain its relevance and power, it must resolve these disputes consistently
with the interests of the disputing parties. To the extent that states submit to compulsory
(ex ante) jurisdiction, the ICJ is relatively independent. Although states can withdraw if
they do not like ICJ judgments, withdrawal incurs political costs and delay, and in the
meantime they cannot stop other states from bringing them to court. To the extent that
treaties provide the basis for the jurisdiction, the ICJ’s independence is moderate. Old
treaties cannot easily be revised, but if states do not like the ICJ’s decisions, they can
refrain from giving it jurisdiction in subsequent treaties.
Let us examine some usage and compliance statistics. Table 5 contains the
numbers for each type of jurisdiction.
Table 5: ICJ Compliance and Usage89
Special Agreement
Treaty
Compulsory
Total or Average

Compliance Rate
85.7%
60%
40%
64.1% (ave.)

Disputes
15
47
30
92 (total)

Disputes/Year
.27
.84
.54
1.64 (total)

Note: advisory jurisdiction excluded; we include only disputes that have resulted in a judgment.

Usage of the ICJ has fluctuated but never reached a significant level. This has led
to complaints by international legal academics about the relatively low usage rate of the
the UN Security Council as well, with three members from African states, two from Latin American states,
two from Asian states, and three from European states (traditionally two from the West and one from the
East of Europe).” Davis Robinson, The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of Judges of the
International Court of Justice, 97 ASIL Proc. 277, 278 (2003).
88
ICJ Statute, arts. 36-37, 65
89
Compiled from Ginsburg and McAdams, supra note __, at appendix: Special agreement: 12 Yes; 2 No; 1
N/A. Treaty: 9 Yes; 6 No; 32 N/A. Compulsory: 4 Yes; 6 No; 20 N/A.
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ICJ and proposals for reform.90 During the 1950s, roughly two or three cases were
submitted each year. During the 1960s, the ICJ fell into virtual disuse, with no new cases
submitted from July 1962 to January 1967, and from February 1967 to August 1971.
Between 1972 and 1985, usage returned to about one to three cases per year, and in the
last 10 years the rate has been roughly two cases per year. This seems like a paltry
amount for a court of first instance from which there is no appeal, which has jurisdiction
over virtually all issues of international law and may be used by nearly every state in the
world.
The low usage rate no doubt stems in part from the reluctance of countries to
agree to compulsory jurisdiction. Only 64 of the 191 members of the UN currently accept
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.91 This is a participation rate of about 34 percent.
By contrast, 34 of 57 UN members (60 percent) accepted compulsory jurisdiction in
1947.92 Today, of the five permanent members of the Security Council, only Great
Britain has accepted compulsory jurisdiction: France, China, the U.S., and Russia have
not (nor has Germany). Among the states that do accept compulsory jurisdiction, they
almost always hedge their consent with numerous conditions. That is a sign that state
parties to the U.N. Charter have chosen not to make use of the Court because they cannot
control its outcomes.93
As for compliance, the McAdams and Ginsburg study finds that in compulsory
jurisdiction cases states comply with the judgment of the ICJ only 40 percent of the
time.94 As Table 5 shows, when the Court becomes more dependent, its compliance rate
rises. When the dispute arises under a treaty, compliance rises to 60 percent. When the
jurisdiction comes from special agreement, state compliance with ICJ decisions rises to
85.7 percent. In short, the more closely tied the jurisdiction is to consent of the parties
that are involved, the more likely that the parties will comply with the judgment.95
An examination of a few cases demonstrates the difficulties that the ICJ has
experienced in achieving compliance with its decisions. One famous example is the case
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between Nicaragua and the United States, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua.96 In 1984 Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States,
claiming that it had violated the U.N. Charter and customary international law, by, among
other things, engaging in attacks on Nicaraguan facilities, and mining Nicaraguan ports,
assisting the contra rebels. Both the United States and Nicaragua had accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 of the Court’s statute. Three days
before the filing of the application by Nicaragua on April 9, 1984, Secretary of State
George Shultz declared that the U.S.’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ would not apply to any disputes arising out of Central America. The Court rejected
this attempt to modify the U.S.’s acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction,
because in making its declaration accepting the jurisdiction in 1946, the U.S. had stated
that it would give six months notice before any withdrawal could take effect.97 The
United States then withdrew completely from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The
Court’s decision on the merits, which appeared in 1986, found the United States breached
its international obligations by attacking Nicaragua and supporting the contras. The
United States ignored the decision.
Refusal to comply with the ICJ has also taken less confrontational forms. In two
cases in the last five years, the United States has refused to comply with ICJ decisions
concerning the rights of foreign citizens who are capital murder defendants to consult
with consular officials after their arrest.98 Under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, the United States had an obligation to notify foreign defendants, at the time of
arrest, that they have a right to contact their consulate. The United States is a party to an
optional protocol that vests jurisdiction in the ICJ to resolve disputes over the Convention
between parties that have ratified the protocol. In 1998, Paraguay initiated proceedings
against the United States on behalf of a capital defendant, Angel Breard, who was to be
executed by the state of Virginia.99 After noting jurisdiction but before reaching the
merits, the ICJ issued a provisional measure—akin to a temporary restraining order—
which ordered that “the United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure
that [Breard] is not executed pending final decision in these proceedings.”100 When the
Supreme Court took up the case, the United States argued that the ICJ order was not
binding and that the execution could proceed. The Supreme Court denied the petition for
a stay of execution and Breard was executed.101 The United States simply refused to obey
the ICJ’s order.
The United States again refused to comply when the same issue arose in a dispute
with Germany. This time, two German brothers had been convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death in Arizona without notification of their Vienna
Convention rights. After one of the brothers was executed, Germany instituted
proceedings against the United States in the ICJ, and again the ICJ issued an order the
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United States to “take all measures at its disposal” to stop the execution while it heard the
case on the merits. The executive branch again opposed a stay of execution before the
Supreme Court, the Court denied the petition, and the execution proceeded.102
Nonetheless, the case proceeded to the merits before the ICJ, which held that the United
States had violated the Vienna Convention and the ICJ’s order, and that the United States
in future was to allow the “review and reconsideration” of the convictions and sentences
in cases where a Vienna Convention violation has occurred.103 While it could be argued
that “review and reconsideration” is sufficiently broad to be satisfied by a state clemency
process, the United States to date has not stopped an execution because of a Vienna
Convention defect.
Failure of the ICJ to achieve compliance is not limited to cases involving the
United States. In the first contentious case to be decided by the Court, the Corfu Channel
case, the losing party refused to comply with the Court’s judgment.104 After warships of
the British Royal Navy struck mines in the Corfu Channel between Albania and Greece,
Great Britain brought a case for damages against Albania, which had agreed to the
Court’s jurisdiction. After the Court issued judgment against Albania, Albania refused to
participate in proceedings on damages and refused to pay the amount decided. Great
Britain responded by withholding Albanian gold recovered from the Nazis, and it was not
until 1992, with a change in regime in Albania, that a settlement was reached and the
gold returned.105 In 1951, Great Britain sued Iran because of the latter’s nationalization of
the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.106 The Court indicated provisional measures to
protect the company and its property, which Iran ignored. Eventually, the Court found it
had no jurisdiction in the case. In 1955, Portugal brought suit against India after India
suspended rights of passage to two remaining Portuguese enclaves in the Indian
subcontinent.107 The Court ruled in 1960 that Portugal had a right under international law
to passage to its enclaves, but India annexed the territories the following year.108 Even
Iceland, by no means a powerful country, has refused to comply with the Court’s rulings.
In 1972, Great Britain brought proceedings against Iceland for its expansion of its
exclusive fisheries zone.109 Iceland refused to appear and disregarded provisional
measures; in 1972-1973, Icelandic and British patrol vessels engaged in the “cod war”
over the fisheries zone.110 Several other cases followed in which states refused to comply
with orders of the ICJ. These include France in a case involving its nuclear weapons
testing in the Pacific,111 Iran and its taking of American diplomatic personnel hostage,112
and Serbia in its support for genocide against the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina.113
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C. Inter-American Court on Human Rights
In 1969, several American states adopted the American Convention of Human
Rights, which established the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR).114 The
Convention, which entered into force in 1978, protects primarily political and civil rights,
such as the right to life, liberty, personal integrity, due process, privacy, property, equal
protection, and freedom of conscience and expressions. The IACHR started operating in
1979; it is a permanent court.115
Before the adoption of the Convention, human rights in the Americas had been
the subject of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, a non-binding
declaration that was adopted at the same time as the creation of the Organization of
American States (OAS).116 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights monitored
compliance with the Declaration, primarily by conducting visits of nations and issuing
country reports about their human rights performance.
Not all members of the OAS are parties to the American Convention. The United
States and Canada, for example, are state parties to the OAS but have not ratified the
American Convention and therefore are not subject to the jurisdiction of the IACHR. The
American Convention has been ratified by 25 of the 35 American states; of these states,
21 have accepted compulsory jurisdiction.117 The IACHR may hear petitions alleging a
violation brought be either the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or by a
state party to the Convention, but not by an individual. Under the American Convention,
the decisions of the IACHR are legally binding and not subject to appeal.118
The IACHR is composed of seven judges nominated by state parties to the
Convention and elected by majority vote of the state parties.119 The judges serve for sixyear terms and may be re-elected once. Ad hoc judges ensure representation on the court
for parties before it.
Contentious cases between state parties may arise in one of three ways. A state
may accept the jurisdiction of the IACHR through a general acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction; a limited acceptance of reciprocal jurisdiction in suits brought by countries
that take on the same obligation; or ad hoc acceptance of jurisdiction in an individual
case.120 Individuals and NGOs have no authority to bring a suit before the Court directly,
but by bringing a matter to the attention of the Commission, they might prod the
Commission—after investigating, issuing a report, and seeking a settlement—to submit
the case to the Court on their behalf. The Court may hear only cases involving a claimed
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violation of the American Convention. It has the authority to order remedial actions or
compensation for violations. In sum, the IACHR is relatively independent.
The Court has heard relatively few contentious cases. As of 2000, it appears to
have heard only 32 contentious cases, and issued only 15 judgments.121 This is a usage
rate of 0.07 cases per state per year (completed). As we will see, this usage rate is much
lower than usage of the European Court on Human Rights. As one scholar on the IACHR
has written, “whereas the European system has during its forty year history generally
regulated democracies with independent judiciaries and governments that observe the
rule of law, the history of much of the Americas since 1960 has been radically different,
with military dictatorships, the violent repression of political opposition and of terrorism
and intimidated judiciaries for a while being the order of the day in a number of
countries.”122 As a result of the recent political history, “human rights issues in the
Americas have often concerned gross, as opposed to ordinary, violations of human rights.
They have been much more to do with the forced disappearance, killing, torture and
arbitrary detention of political opponents and terrorists than with particular issues
concerning, for example, the right to a fair trial or freedom of expression that are the
stock in trade” of the ECHR.123 There are many cases, it is fair to say, that have arisen in
Latin America in the last 25 years over which there is little or no dispute that grievous
violations of the American Convention have occurred.124
Compliance with IACHR decisions is mixed. The IACHR often orders two types
of remedies in a case: the trial and punishment of offenders within a state party and
changes in domestic law, and monetary compensation for the complainant. It appears that
states routinely ignore the requirement that they try and punish offenders or change their
domestic laws, but that they will often pay financial compensation. We have found only
one case in which a nation has fully complied with an IACHR decision. Even in that
decision, the Honduran Disappeared Persons case, the defendant state, Honduras, did not
pay the award until eight years after the Court had rendered its final judgment. In all the
other cases, it appears that nations have not fully complied and the Court continues to
“supervise” compliance.125 This amounts to an approximately 5 percent compliance rate.
Interestingly, the Inter-American Commission, which only issues non-binding country
reports that seek to convince nations to change their human rights policies, reports a 4
percent rate of full compliance with its reports.126 Thus, not only is there a low
compliance rate with the decisions of the permanent, independent IACHR, but it does not
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achieve a significantly higher degree of compliance than a body that does not even hear
cases and has no binding legal authority under international law.
As for awards of monetary compensation, states have made full financial
compensation in 23.6 percent of the cases, and in 14.5 percent of cases no compensation
was found necessary. In the rest of the cases, slightly greater than 60 percent, states have
engaged in either no or partial compliance.127
There are the usual problems with selection effects. But given the low usage and
compliance rates, we can be reasonably confident in concluding that the IACHR has not
been an effective tribunal.
D. GATT and WTO Adjudication Systems
GATT was created in 1947. It was initially intended as a temporary framework
for international trade negotiations, but was indefinitely extended when the treaty
creating the International Trade Organization was not ratified by the United States.
GATT’s charter did not provide for formal adjudication of trade disputes, and instead
states submitted their disputes to arbitration under the GATT secretariat’s auspices.
The informal panel system handled hundreds of disputes over nearly 40 years.
However, the system did not always work well. States could block or delay the
establishment of panels and the adoption of judgments, and often did. Frustration with
these practices led to evasion of the system. States would rely on unilateral retaliation and
during many years did not use the GATT dispute mechanism at all. Dissatisfaction with
the arbitration system, as well as with other aspects of GATT, prompted member states to
establish the WTO in 1995. The Dispute Resolution Understanding of that year created a
more formal, court-like adjudication system.128
GATT. The GATT system was essentially a formalized arbitration system. If
consultations fail, a party may request the creation of a panel. Because GATT acts by
consensus, either party can block the creation of a panel; therefore, as in an ordinary
arbitration, a panel will be appointed only if both parties consent. The two parties must
agree to the members of the panel, and much delay can occur before agreement is
reached. After the panel hears the case and renders a judgment, the GATT members
decide by consensus whether the panel’s judgment will be adopted. Again, because both
parties’ consent is needed, the losing party can block adoption of the panel’s judgment.
If a panel’s judgment is adopted by GATT members, but the losing party does not
comply with it, the winner can again seek GATT authorization for the implementation of
127
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sanctions. The loser again has the opportunity to block such authorization. This happened
in every case but one.129 Thus, although losing states did not usually block adoption of a
panel’s judgment against them, they almost always blocked authorization of sanctions
against them. The winning party would then have to decide whether or not to implement
unilateral sanctions, which would be a technical violation of GATT. The United States
frequently engaged in unilateral retaliation.
In 1989, the GATT system was revised; the most important innovation was the
elimination of the right to veto a panel. However, because the right to veto adoption of
the panel report was retained, the GATT system remained highly dependent, as we define
the term.
WTO. The 1995 Dispute Settlement Understanding created a system much closer
to a court. After consultations fail, the complaining party has a right to request the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to appoint a panel. If such a request is made, the DSB,
which consists of all members of the WTO, must create a panel unless all DSB members
agree not to. Since the complaining state would not ordinarily agree to the dismissal of its
own complaint, this consensus rule effectively makes appointment of the panel
automatic. And although the parties can recommend individuals for the panel, the WTO
Director-General may appoint a panel if the parties cannot agree. Because of this,
strategic delay of the formation of the panel is difficult. The panel consists of three
people who are not nationals of the disputing parties, unless the parties agree otherwise.
After the panel hears the case and renders a judgment, the judgment is adopted by the
DSB unless there is a consensus against doing so. Again, because the winner is a member
of the DSB, and thus can block any effort to refuse to adopt the judgment, the adoption of
the judgment is effectively automatic.
The DSU created an appellate procedure. A standing appellate body consists of
seven members drawn from the WTO membership. They have four year terms. Appellate
panels usually consist of three of the members of the appellate body drawn at random. As
a result, a national of one of the state parties will not necessarily hear the case. The
appellate body’s decision is adopted by the DSU unless all members agree otherwise.
If the losing party does not comply with a judgment that has been adopted by the
DSU, the DSU may authorize sanctions. Here again, the consensus rule applies against
the losing party. It can avoid sanctions only if all members of the DSB, including the
winner, agree. Thus, sanctions are effectively automatic.
Because the GATT and WTO dispute resolution systems apply to the same
subject matter—international trade—they provide a valuable opportunity for evaluating
our hypotheses. The GATT system is highly dependent, in our terms: the WTO system is
highly independent. The members of GATT abandoned the GATT system because they
believed that it could be improved, and the WTO system was the result. But has it been
more effective?
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Our first test of effectiveness is usage. A tribunal that is used is more successful
than a tribunal that is not used. A first look at usage statistics suggests that the WTO
system is superior to the GATT system. There were 432 complaints under GATT from
1948 to 1994; there have been 227 disputes under WTO from 1995 through 2000. The
GATT system, then, handled 9.2 disputes per year; the WTO system has handled 37.9
disputes per year.130
However, a fair comparison of the two systems must control for diverse factors.
The membership in GATT/WTO has increased rapidly over this time period, and one
reason for the increase in the number of disputes has been the increase in membership. In
addition, the GATT system as a whole, not just the adjudication system, took a while to
develop, and has been subject to various crises—for example, in the decade following the
establishment of the EC, when Europe effectively withdrew from GATT while it
consolidated its gains.131 If we limit our comparison to, say, 1989-1994, GATT’s usage
statistics look better, with 20.3 complaints per year.132 If we control for membership
(GATT’s mean membership for this period was 105, WTO’s was 132),133 and look at
complaints per state per year, we find, 0.19 complaints per state per year for GATT, and
0.29 complaints per state per year for WTO. Finally, if we control for state pairs,134 we
find 0.0037 complaints per state pair per year for GATT, and 0.0044 complaints per state
pair per year for WTO. The difference between these rates is not statistically significant.
Disputes also should arise more frequently as interaction increases. So we should
also control for subject matter and trade volume. The Uruguay round produced, in
addition to the WTO, an extension of international trade law to include intellectual
property and services. Thus, there could be disputes about these topics during the WTO
era; there could not be such disputes before 1995. And, even within the subject matter
areas that remained constant, the increasing volume of world trade created new
opportunities for clashes. The volume of international trade for merchandise among WTO
members increased from 3 trillion dollars in 1991, to 48 trillion dollars in 1997.135 One
would suppose that if the GATT system had never been changed, usage would have
increased on account of this greater volume of trade, though not necessarily in a linear
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fashion. Conservatively supposing there were twice as many opportunities for disputes in
1997 as in 1991, usage measured as complaints per state per year per dollar of trade
would favor GATT over WTO.
There is one statistical study comparing usage rates of GATT and WTO. Eric
Reinhardt found in a study of 704 dispute initiations from 1948 to 1998 that the
probability that a developed state initiated a dispute against another developed state was
higher under WTO than under GATT. However, he did not control for the total increase
in world trade, nor for the expansion of international trade law to include services and
intellectual property.136 As we saw, the second factor is of considerable significance, and
ought to be included in a regression. Focusing just on the traditional users of the
international trade system—the developed countries—Reinhardt found no difference in
the probability of a dispute under the two systems, after controlling for membership, size
of economy,137 and similar factors, including possible bandwagon and feedback
effects.138 Again, the regression lacked controls for total world trade and the expansion of
international law, and so was probably biased in favor of the WTO. In sum, usage did not
increase, and may have declined.
Let us turn to compliance. Between 1995 and 2000, the WTO adjudication
mechanism ruled unambiguously in favor of complainants in 41 cases. Of these cases, the
defendant complied fully 73 percent of the time; and complied either fully or partially 88
percent of the time. In 68 GATT cases between 1980 and 1994 the defendant complied
fully 54 percent of the time; and complied either fully or partially 76 percent of the
time.139 The differences between the WTO statistics and the GATT statistics do not pass
standard hypotheses tests.
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A study confined to EU-U.S. trade disputes found that compliance was lower
under the WTO than under the GATT. Looking just at those cases in which a ruling was
issued in favor of the complainant, compliance under GATT occurred 63 percent of the
time (10 of 16), while compliance under WTO occurred 33 percent of the time (2 of 6).140
Although these statistics are suggestive—and suggest that the WTO system is no
better, and possibly worse, than the GATT system was—they are hampered by selection
effects. When states decide whether to file a complaint or settle, they take into account
the likelihood that a complaint would lead to a judgment, and that this judgment would
cause the defendant to bring its behavior into compliance with trade law. A better system
might produce compliance statistics that are equal to those of a worse system, because
under the better system the easier cases are settled and only the harder and more
politically sensitive cases make it to judgment.141
One way to minimize selection problems is to look farther back in the dispute
procedure, at settlement as well as compliance. Although a better system and worse
system might have equal compliance rates, the better system should produce more
settlements, and this effect should be reflected in greater rates of concession, both in the
aggregate and during the period in which settlement may occur. Here are data for
concessions granted in response to complaints (settlements as well as complied-with
judgments):
Table 6: Concessions in the GATT and WTO Systems142
GATT
WTO

None
85 (38%)
32 (20%)

Partial
54 (24%)
20 (13%)

Full
87 (38%)
102 (66%)

Total
226
154

Total

117 (30%)

74 (19%)

189 (50%)

380

Note: All GATT/WTO disputes from 1980 through 2000 for which the authors have outcomes (77% of
cases, 380 out of 496 complaints made during this period, in total).

WTO beats GATT for every level of concession. WTO achieves full concessions, for
example, in 66 percent of the cases, whereas GATT achieves full concessions in only 38
percent of the cases.
Busch and Reinhardt point out, however, that at the same time that the WTO
dispute mechanism was created, trade law was expanded to include services and
intellectual property (as we noted above). They argue that when the scope of trade law is
expanded, states will initially bring the easiest disputes—the low-hanging fruit—and
140
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these disputes are most likely to result in substantial concessions. Their hypothesis that
the expansion of trade law accounts for the greater success of the WTO is confirmed by a
regression that shows that cases involving services and intellectual property are resolved
at a much higher rate than the other cases in the WTO system, and a dummy variable
measuring whether the cases is brought under GATT or WTO no longer predicts a higher
level of concessions at a statistically significant level.143 In other words, the dispute
resolution procedures of WTO cannot be credited for the enhanced levels of concessions.
An additional study involving only disputes between the EU and the U.S. produces
similar results.144
The concession data, then, do not show that either system is better than the other:
they are about the same. However, one must worry again about selection effects. Busch
and Reinhardt assume that settlements occur after a complaint is filed, and so their data
include only post-complaint settlements. But it is also possible that an injured state and a
violator will settle prior to the filing of a complaint. It is theoretically possible that one
system produces greater concessions at the pre-complaint stage.145
A possible solution is to look instead at overall trade flows starting prior to the
dispute. The theory here is that if a state either loses an adjudication and complies with
the judgment, or eliminates an illegal trade barrier because of the threat of a complaint,
then its behavior should be reflected in the volume of imports from the complainant.
When the illegal barrier is removed, the volume should increase.
Chad Bown conducts a test using this proxy on a set of disputes involving
allegations of excessive import protection from 1973 to 1998.146 The dependent variable
is the log growth rate of the defendant’s imports from plaintiff in the disputed sector from
1 year before to 3 years after the dispute. He finds no evidence that the WTO
adjudication procedures were more effective than the GATT procedures. His main
finding is that an adjudication is more likely to be successful (in the sense of increasing
trade flows) when the complainant has a large share of the defendant’s exports. The
retaliatory capacity of the injured state, rather than the details of the adjudication regime,
drives compliance with international trade law.
Our brief discussion of research on trade adjudication cannot do justice to the
complexity of the subject, and the research itself is at an early stage, as is experience with
the WTO system. The safest conclusion so far is that WTO adjudication procedures have
increased neither the probability that states will use adjudication to resolve trade disputes,
nor the probability that states will obey trade law. However, we think that once the
massive increase in world trade is taken into account, the WTO usages statistics look
meager, and the case for GATT’s superiority becomes stronger.
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Busch and Reinhardt blame the WTO’s legalism for its lack of progress. The
GATT panels were adjuncts to diplomacy; the WTO’s procedures encourage states to
litigate. They emphasize WTO’s greater reliance on rules.147 However, there is no reason
to think that rules by themselves should increase litigation. If the removal of the veto
makes litigation more attractive because the defendant cannot block it, the increased
likelihood of noncompliance must make litigation less attractive. We have emphasized
instead that the increase in independence from GATT to WTO should reduce usage and
compliance, and have found some suggestive—but currently inconclusive—evidence for
this view.
E. Comparison of Tribunals
In this section, we try to compare the tribunals more directly. We want to show
that independence and effectiveness are uncorrelated (our weak thesis) or negatively
correlated (our strong thesis), against the conventional wisdom that they are positively
correlated. To do so, we need to assign numbers to our two variables, independence and
effectiveness.
To measure independence, we construct a five point scale, with one point for each
of the five characteristics that distinguish an independent tribunal from a dependent
tribunal. These are: (1) compulsory jurisdiction; (2) no right to a judge being a national;
(3) permanent body; (4) judges having fixed terms; and (5) right of third parties to
intervene. Table 7 summarizes this information as well as providing the dates for the start
and (if applicable) termination of the tribunal, and the nature of its jurisdiction. We also
supply information for the European courts, the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, and the International Criminal Court, for purpose of comparison.
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Table 7: Independence of Tribunals148
Court

Start

End

Juris.

1979
*

PCA
PCIJ
ICJ–Comp

1792
*
1899
1919
1946

ICJ–Other

1946

GATT
ECJ

1947
1952

ECHR

1959

IACHR

1979

specific
dispute
general
general
general
specific
dispute or
treaty
trade
general
human
rights
human
rights

Arb.

WTO
(App)
ITLOS
ICC

1945

1995

Compul
. Juris.

No Right
to
Nationals

Permanen
t Body of
Judges

Term of
Judges

3d
Party
Interv.

Indep.
Score**

no

no

no

ad hoc

no

0

no
yes
yes

no
no
no

no
yes
yes

ad hoc
9
9

no
no
yes

0
3
4

no

no

yes

9

no

2

no
yes

no
no

no
yes

ad hoc
6

no
yes

0
4

yes

no

yes

6

yes

4

yes

no

yes

6

no

3

1995

trade

yes

yes

yes

4

yes

5

1996
not
yet

maritime
intern’l
crimes

yes

no

yes

9

yes

4

yes

no

yes

9

yes

4

* Stuyt’s sample; ad hoc arbitration has existed since ancient times, and continues to the present day.
** 1 point for each of: state can be bound to ruling without its consent to adjudication; possible that no
national on panel that hears dispute; judges form permanent body; judges’ terms extend beyond a given
dispute; third parties may intervene: maximum of 5.

Next we turn to effectiveness. Table 8 contains information about usage and
compliance for all of the tribunals.
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(http://www.pict-pcti.org/); and updated where necessary from the tribunals’ own websites.
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Table 8: Usage and Compliance Rates149
Court
Arb.
PCA
PCIJ
ICJ–Comp
ICJ–Other
GATT
ECJ
ECHR
IACHR
WTO
ITLOS
ICC

Years

Cases
Begun

Subject
States

Cases/
Year

—
104
26
57
57
48
51
44
24
8
9
1

—
33
36
30
62
298
12,800
1000s
32**
213**
10
0

—
88
63
62
187
128*
15
44
21
146
145
92

0.15
0.32
1.38
0.53
1.09
6.21
251
—
1.33
27
1.11
—

Cases/
Year*States
***
0.007
0.004
0.022
0.008
0.017
0.05
17
—
0.06
0.18
0.008
—

Full
Compliance
Rate
44-94%
—
—
40%
72%
38%
82%
80%
4%
66%
—
—

Compliance
Reputation
good
—
bad/mixed
bad
—
mixed
good
good
bad
mixed
—
—

* as of 1994.
** as of 2000.
*** mean used when membership changed over time.
Note: for ICJ, PCIJ we exclude advisory cases; unless otherwise indicated, data as of 2003 or (for subject
states) end of period of operation; ECHR: data omitted because of importance of 1998 changes; usage is
very high; ad hoc arbitration data for 1880-1899.

The evidence is hard to interpret for many reasons. We have already discussed the
problem of selection effects. There are also many problems of comparison. Is a tribunal
that is used rarely but also has a limited jurisdiction more or less effective than a tribunal
that is used more frequently but also has a broader jurisdiction? With these problems in
mind, we forge ahead and combine the tables, as follows.
Table 9: Relationship between Independence and Effectiveness
Low (0–1)
Effectiveness

Independence
Medium (2–3)

High (4–5)

Low

[PCA]

PCIJ, IACHR

ICJ–Comp

High

Arb., GATT

ICJ–Other

[ECJ], [ECHR], WTO

As the PCA was essentially redundant with the ad hoc arbitration system, it should be
excluded. It was not used much because it did not add anything to the arbitration system.
For reasons that we discuss in the next Part, the ECJ and ECHR should be excluded as
149

Sources are as follows. For arbitration, see Stuyt, supra note __. For PCA and PCIJ, see Butler, supra
note __. For ICJ, see Ginsburg and McAdams, supra note __. For GATT and WTO, see Busch and
Reinhardt, supra note __. For ECJ, see Stacy Nyikos, The European Court of Justice and National Courts:
Strategic Interaction within the EU Judicial Process, http://law.wustl.edu/igls/Conconfpapers/Nyikos.pdf.
For ECHR, see our discussion in Part IV.B., infra. For ITLOS, see www.itlos.org. For ICC, see
http://www.icc-cpi.int/php/show.php?id=home&l=EN. For ICJ, PCIJ we exclude advisory cases; unless
otherwise indicated, data as of 2003 or (for subject states) end of period of operation; ECHR: data omitted
because of importance of 1998 changes; usage is very high; ad hoc arbitration data for 1880-1899.
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well. The WTO, then, is the best evidence for the view that independence and
effectiveness is correlated; however, as we argued, the WTO has been no more effective,
and arguably less effective, than the GATT during its last ten years.150 At a minimum,
there is no evidence for positive correlation between independence and effectiveness.
This is our weak thesis.
Our strong thesis—that the correlation is in fact negative—is supported by
arbitration and GATT (dependent, effective tribunals); by the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction (independent, ineffective); the absence of a real example of a dependent,
ineffective tribunal; and the absence of a real example of an independent, effective
tribunal, once the European courts are excluded, and the WTO is put aside. Further
supporting our strong thesis is the (partial) evidence of increasing effectiveness of the
trade tribunal from GATT to WTO; and the evidence of superior performance of the ICJ
when its jurisdiction is consensual rather than compulsory.
A final proxy for effectiveness is the budget. States can starve tribunals that they
do not like by denying them funds; in addition, a small budget may indicate that the
tribunal has mainly a symbolic purpose. Table 10 provides the figures (with some
American court systems thrown in for purposes of comparison).
Table 10: Budgets of Tribunals151
Tribunal
ICJ
ITLOS
WTO
ICTY
ICTR
ECHR
IACHR
ECJ
U.S. Federal Judiciary
U.S. Supreme Court

Budget*
20.2 (2001)
5.8
1.3152
64.8
56.7
25.3
1.1
141.1
4,060 (1999)
40 (2002)

* FY 1998 unless otherwise indicated; in millions of U.S. dollars (rounded).
These budgetary figures are hard to compare for various reasons but they should give
pause to those who claim that international adjudication has great significance. Only the
ECJ has a significant budget. It is striking that the budgets for the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals, whose jurisdictions are microscopic, are 2-3 times greater than that of
150

Table 8’s data on GATT are for the entire period; as we discussed earlier, GATT’s last five or ten years
provide better comparison. See supra.
151
Sources are PICT (www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/Matrix-main.html) for the foreign tribunals; OMB
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/) for American courts.
152
This figure is from the PICT website. The WTO’s entire budget is over $100 million, but the WTO does
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the ICJ, which, recall, is a court of original jurisdiction with no appeal. The budgetary
figures imply that states do not believe that they gain much from international
adjudication; if they did, they would invest more in it.
IV. EUROPE AND INTEGRATION
European international courts pose a challenge to our account of international
tribunals. The widespread belief that the ECJ and the ECHR are both independent and
effective lies behind the conventional wisdom that independence is the key to success for
international tribunals. In this Part, we argue that the European courts are more like
domestic courts than like international courts. Independent courts can be effective if they
exist within a political community. Europe has such a community (keeping in mind, of
course, that the ECJ and the ECHR encompass different sets of nations, with only the
former a part of the European Union); the rest of the world does not. Therefore, the ECJ
and the ECHR cannot be models for international tribunals.
A. Integration
Domestic judges in advanced liberal democracies are generally regarded as
independent of the parties who appear before them. Their independence is not due solely
to lifetime tenure: most judges, even in the U.S., do not have lifetime tenure. In the
United States, many state judges are elected; and judges in foreign countries can belong
to a bureaucracy that is subordinate to elected officials. The reason that judges are
independent is that the parties that appear before them do not pay their salaries or
exercise any control over them. In a well-functioning state, parties are too weak to
influence judges. Only when the government is a party do judges feel pressure to
abandon their stance of neutrality, pressure that many but not all judges are able to resist.
If parties cannot influence judges, then they cannot be sure that judges will decide
disputes in an unbiased way. Judges might instead apply ideological commitments,
personal policy preferences, or other criteria that prevent a decision within the parties’
win set. Why then do parties voluntarily submit their disputes to judges when they could
otherwise rely on nonlegal mechanisms such as nonbinding arbitration? Nonbinding
arbitration is the domestic analogue to international arbitration, because in both cases no
third party enforcement mechanism ensures compliance with the judgment, and
arbitrators must please parties if they want to be used again. However, domestic courts
can offer parties something that international tribunals cannot: a judgment that will be
enforced by marshals and police. Domestic parties thus face a tradeoff: courts can offer
enforcement but judges are not as dependent as arbitrators are, and thus can be counted
on to provide less accurate judgments. Parties frequently split the difference by relying on
binding arbitration; courts enforce the awards but refrain from second guessing
arbitrators and review their judgments only for abuse.
Domestic courts can call on the executive branch (in the U.S.) to enforce their
judgments only because the executive branch is willing to enforce courts’ judgments. If it
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were not, then domestic courts would be helpless and they would rarely be used. It is not
entirely clear why the executive branch obeys the orders of courts, but part of the reason
is surely that courts are reasonably reliable and enforce the law rather than their own
preferences; and this, in turn, is due to the training and attitudes of judges. Judges are
chosen from the mainstream political community and share the values of the main
political parties. Elected officials also retain power over judges: they control their
resources, their jurisdiction, and other elements of their positions.
By contrast, international courts cannot rely on third party enforcement. There is
no world “executive branch” that can enforce judgments. If, as we have argued, states
comply with international judgments only when they are within the states’ win sets, then
compliance will occur only within the context of the parties’ continuing relationship.
A second difference between domestic and international courts is the legislature.
If domestic courts interpret laws badly, misinterpret custom, overlook important social
and economic changes, and so forth, legislatures can correct them—both by changing the
law and by modifying the court system. By contrast, there is no world “legislative
branch” that can reliably correct the errors of international tribunals. Instead, these errors
can be changed only through consensus, or occasionally unilateral action by a powerful
state.
We argue that tribunals can be effective only in an institutional setting where
external agents will enforce their judgments and correct their errors. This setting can be
found in many states, but not in all; it is rarely found in international affairs. But there is
an important middle case: when a group of states form a union or confederation of some
sort.
The European Union is not the first such group of states. Germany prior to
unification in 1871 was a confederation, as were the confederated states of America prior
to union in 1788. A confederation or union can be distinguished from the international
realm by the existence of law for which individuals (or elites or interest groups) within
the union feel loyalty, in a way that transcends their national loyalties. When a
confederation has such a political community, it also can frequently legislate new rules
and execute judgments. Only then can there be a relatively independent judiciary that is
also effective.
The members of the EU have developed their own law—European Community
law—that governs their relationships and no others.153 Most legislation is proposed by the
European Commission (which consists of delegates from each member of the EU) and
adopted by the Council of the European Union (which consists of ministers from each
member of the EU, the composition depending on the issue) and an increasingly
influential European Parliament filled with representatives who are directly elected by the
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EU’s citizens.154 The voting system is a combination of unanimity and majority rule,
depending on the topic. And a large bureaucracy, the Commission, further implements
the decisions of the Council and Parliament. Although these institutions are far from
those of a regular federal state, they are also far (in the other direction) from the
institutions that are used for normal interstate governance. The main point of similarity is
the absence of enforcement through an executive agency.
B. European Tribunals
1. The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was established in 1952 as the judicial body
for the European Coal and Steel Community.155 It has remained the principal judicial
organ for members of the European Community even as they have evolved from a loose
collection of several communities156 into the European Union157 under the 1992 Treaty of
European Union158 and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.159 Its purpose is to settle disputes
between the different actors of the European Union, which includes member states, EU
institutions such as the Commission, Council, and Parliament, and sometimes private
parties. It also functions to ensure the uniform interpretation of European law, and
national courts may refer questions of European law to it.160 The substantive law derives
from the treaties that have formed the European Communities and the European Union,
the regulations and directives issued by European Community institutions in exercising
the powers conferred to them by the treaties, and treaties to which the Community is a
party.161 It is a permanent court that hears disputes concerning the interpretation and
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application of the European Community treaties and secondary laws created under their
authority.162
The ECJ is composed of 15 judges,163 the same as the number of member states.
They are appointed for renewable six year terms by the unanimous consent of the
member states. By tradition, each member state has one representative on the bench.
Parties cannot raise objections, based on nationality, to the membership of a chamber that
hears the case.164
The jurisdiction of the ECJ covers mainly three types of cases.165 First are claims
brought against member states by the Community for violations of EC law; 166 second are
claims brought against Community institutions;167 and third are referrals from member
states’ domestic courts concerning questions of EC law.168 Cases against member states
for violations of EC law can be brought by other member states, but this occurs rarely;
cases are ordinarily brought by the European Commission.169 Cases under the second
fount of jurisdiction can be brought by member states, other EC institutions, or
individuals that have a direct and particular interest in the outcome. The third type of
jurisdiction occurs when a question of EC law arises in the domestic proceedings of a
member state’s national court. Although it is the decision of the national court whether to
seek the referral, the individual parties to the case may participate in the ECJ
proceedings. If a question of EC law arises in the national court of last resort, it has an
obligation to refer the issue to the ECJ.170 Member states and the Commission may
intervene in all cases, and private parties may intervene in cases involving other private
parties, with some exceptions.171 The member states have an obligation to ensure that
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ECJ judgments are enforced within their domestic legal systems.172 Each member state
must designate a national authority whose function it is to enforcement ECJ judgments.
These characteristics—compulsory jurisdiction, judges with fixed terms, a continuing
body, and so forth—are those of an independent tribunal.
The ECJ receives approximately 500 new cases each year and disposes of roughly
that amount, with 907 cases still pending as of 2002. From 1998 through 2002, the most
recent figures available, the largest number of cases were referrals for preliminary rulings
on EC law by national judiciaries, of which there were 241 in 2002, with the next largest
class direct actions, of which there were 215 in 2002. While the number of preliminary
ruling cases has remained fairly constant, the number of direct actions has steadily risen
from 136 in 1998.173
Compliance by EU member states with ECJ decisions appears to be significant.
One study finds that noncompliance with ECJ decisions by national judiciaries from 1961
to 1995 occurred in only 0.6 percent of cases, and efforts at evasion of compliance
occurred in 2.9 percent of cases (through referring the question again, or by reinterpreting
the ECJ decision). In 40.9 percent of the cases, the litigants voluntarily agreed to forgo
further proceedings leading to a national court decision and immediately implemented the
ECJ decision.174
However, there is reason for doubting these figures.175 Apparently, it is common
in some countries to conceal evasion with ECJ decisions or to plead problems with
implementation.176 At the end of the first decade of common market integration under the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC),177 the ECJ heard a series
of cases challenging existing trade quotas on agricultural products among member states,
which, after a transition period ending in 1969, were to be abolished and replaced with
EU-wide marketing organizations. 178 In one of these cases, France appears to have defied
an ECJ decision requiring elimination of an import quota on bananas; in another, France
even announced before the ECJ had rendered its decision (which it lost) that it would
refuse to comply with a decision requiring it to eliminate a quota on mutton.179 States that
have refused to comply also have sought other means of resistance other than outright
defiance, such as supporting other governments that defy ECJ rulings or seeking
172
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collective efforts to constrain the ECJ either through secondary EC legislation or even
proposals to change the basic EC treaties.180 One scholar argues that noncompliance with
ECJ decisions has increased in response to efforts by the European Commission and the
ECJ to strengthen enforcement mechanisms during the period of the deepening of the
European internal market in the 1990s.181
According to figures supplied by the European Commission,182 states had
neglected judgments of the ECJ in infringement cases—cases where the Commission
claims a member state has failed to implement an EU directive—30 times by the early
1980s, and more than 80 times by the late 1980s. The Commission reported in 1989, in
regard to member state implementation of the EU’s internal market measures, that “a
fundamental problem is compliance with ECJ judgments; that the increase in
infringement proceedings is reflected not only in a less satisfactory implementation of
Community law, but also and more particularly in a growing number of non-enforced
judgments, gives real cause for concern . . . The burden of non-implementation of the
ECJ decisions is particularly felt in the internal market domain.”183 While international
legal scholars commonly like to say that the ECJ has an almost perfect rate of
compliance, it seems that noncompliance is less rare than commonly thought. It does not
appear at present that a comprehensive empirical examination of compliance with ECJ
decisions has been done.184
Nonetheless, we think it reasonable to conclude that the ECJ is an independent
tribunal that has relatively high usage and compliance rates. Indeed, this correlation is the
source of the conventional wisdom that international tribunals’ effectiveness increases
with their independence. But the reason for this is that the ECJ is not truly an
“international court” for purposes of comparison with the ICJ, arbitral tribunals, and other
courts.
The special character of the ECJ, compared to other courts, can be seen in its
daily workings. Virtually none of the ECJ’s direct action cases involve suits between
180
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member states, much as there are very few inter-state lawsuits in the U.S. system. Rather,
most of the direct lawsuits are brought by the institutions of the European Union itself,
particularly the European Commission, against Member States for failure to comply with
their treaty obligations.185 Further, the close integration of the ECJ with the member
states’ national judiciaries—in which EU questions are referred by the domestic courts to
the ECJ and ECJ decisions are often directly implemented by domestic courts186—more
closely resembles the relationship between local and national courts in a federal system,
than international dispute resolution.187 The “great bulk of the court’s case load is
generated by preliminary references from national judges responding to claims made by
private actors.”188 Indeed, the close interrelationship between national and EC law is
reflected in the acceptance by most of the member states, of the principle of the
supremacy of Community law to national law as articulated by the ECJ’s decisions.189
However the level of compliance differs throughout the European Union due to the
different constitutional traditions of the Member States.190
The distinctive character of the ECJ has led several observers to
characterize the ECJ as a “constitutional court” for the European Communities, with the
supreme law being the various EC treaties.191 These scholars view the ECJ’s primary
function, through the preliminary reference system, of promoting a consistent
interpretation and application of EC law throughout Europe. This has arisen, however,
not through direct actions between member states, but through the mechanism of
preliminary references, which have created an indirect method for private actors to bring
lawsuits challenging member state or EC decisions.192 Indeed, although the French or
German government were willing to ignore ECJ judgments against them, they were not
willing to ignore their own domestic courts, which would order the government to
comply with the ECJ judgment. The governments did not provoke a domestic
constitutional crisis by rejecting the judgments of their own courts, because they shared
with their courts and many domestic interest groups the goal of European integration.193
If the ECJ embraced integration, it was with the acquiescence of the European
governments.
Thus, while we acknowledge that the ECJ provides the best case against our
strong hypothesis, and for the competing hypothesis that independence increases the
effectiveness, we argue that this latter view does not take account of the special
circumstances of Europe. In an integrated “state” or union, unity comes from the
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common interests and backgrounds of citizens and subnational groups, not from the states
themselves. This system cannot be a model for international courts, where relationships
between states are thin and fraught with conflict.194
2. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
The ECHR was established by the European Convention of Human Rights in
1953, which was created by the member states of the Council of Europe.195 The ECHR
was established to monitor compliance by the member states with the Convention’s
substantive terms. The Convention protects individual rights, such as the right to life, the
prohibition on torture, freedom of expression and thought, as well as more ambiguous
liberties, such as the right to education and the right to private and family life. Initially,
the Convention established a two-stage process, in which cases were filtered by the
ECHR, which decided whether to attempt mediation of the dispute or whether to refer the
case to the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Council of Europe. If a referral was
made, the complaining state or person could seek binding adjudication before the Court.
In 1998, the Commission was eliminated and the Court was established as the only
institution that hears complaints under the Convention.196
The ECHR is composed of judges equal in number to the member states to the
Convention, which currently numbers 44. The judges serve for renewable six-year terms.
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Each state party may nominate three candidates, who may or may not be nationals; they
are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.197 There is no
guarantee that every member state will have a national on the Court, and no restriction on
the number of judges of each nationality. Nonetheless, it appears that each member state
has one representative, whether its national or not (an ad hoc judge198), on the Court.199
The jurisdiction of the Court is broad. Any state party, individual, group, or NGO
may bring a suit claiming a human rights violation against one of the member states, as
long as domestic remedies have been exhausted.200 Originally, a member state could
choose not to allow jurisdiction over itself in cases brought by non-states, but in 1998—at
the same time as the elimination of the Commission—the Court’s jurisdiction was made
compulsory as to all state parties as to all complaints.201 In sum, the judges are relatively
independent, similar to the judges of the ECJ.
Usage of the ECHR has increased steadily since its inception, in response to the
expansions in jurisdiction by amendment to the Convention. By the time of the 1998
expansion in compulsory jurisdiction of the Commission, the annual number of
applications had increased from 404 in 1980 to 4750 in 1997. The number of cases
referred to the Court itself had risen from 7 in 1981 to 119 in 1997. In the three years
since the 1998 changes, the number of applications rose from 5,979 in 1998 to 13,858 in
2001. In 2002, the Court received 28,255 applications and delivered 844 judgments.202
Almost all of this activity involves cases brought by individuals against their own state,
rather than state-to-state disputes. Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare these usage
numbers with those for other international tribunals, which do not permit individuals to
bring cases (for the most part).
The Convention does not require that member states follow any specific process
for bringing their laws or actions into compliance with ECHR decisions.203 The EHCR
has no method of enforcement in cases where a state party to a case refuses to comply.204
States have responded in several different ways, including administrative rulemaking,
implementation by national judiciaries, enactment of conforming legislation, and even
changes to domestic constitutions. The great majority of state responses, close to 80
percent, involve legislative enactments, and both legislative and administrative responses
amount to 91 percent of the cases where a change is sought.205
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Although some commentators suggest that levels of compliance with ECHR
rulings are high,206 there is in fact no good compliance data that we have found.207 By the
middle of 1999, the Court had addressed more than 1,000 petitions, nearly all of them
initiated by private parties. More than 670 were adjudicated on the merits with more than
460 resulting in a finding of a violation of the Convention. The Court claims that member
states have consistently paid damages when ordered to, but it also reports only 294 cases
in which states have altered their domestic laws in compliance with an ECHR decision.
This would mean, if each merits decision required a change in domestic law, a
compliance rate of roughly 64 percent. This figure is highly imprecise, as it is unclear
what percentage of human rights violations, if any, might be the result of actions of
government officials that are ultra vires of existing law.
Another means of judging compliance is through the Article 41 action, which
permits plaintiffs who do not receive full compensation from the losing member state
after an ECHR decision to seek additional compensation. According to one study
covering the years 1960 through 1995, Article 41 claims occurred in 48 out of 292 cases
in which the ECHR found a violation of the Convention (16.4 percent). The percentage of
cases that generated Article 41 claims was initially quite high: in 1970, more than 50
percent of all cases that found a violation of the Convention were followed by Article 41
claims, and that number hovered around 50 percent until the early 1980s. That number
dropped below 24 percent by 1995, but during that period a procedural change occurred
which combined Article 41 claims into the actual merits decision, so it is difficult to
determine what the actual level of noncompliance is now.
To sum up, we do not know whether compliance with ECHR judgments has been
high or low. We also cannot say whether usage has been high or low compared to that of
international tribunals. Although the ECHR caseload of hundreds compares favorably to,
say, the IACHR’s caseload of dozens, millions of people may file cases with the ECHR,
whereas only a handful of states may file claims with the IACHR. The usage rate for the
ECHR might therefore seem comparatively paltry. For these reasons, we do not think the
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ECHR provides strong evidence for the conventional wisdom that ties independence and
effectiveness.
C. Summary
We know that independent tribunals—in our technical sense, tribunals that do not
depend on the good will of the parties that appear before them—can be effective within a
state. When the government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; when it will
use this monopoly in order to enforce judicial orders; and when it can legislate in cases
where judicial lawmaking goes awry, independent tribunals can do much good. These
conditions are not met in the interstate case, where nothing prevents a state from ignoring
tribunals except a general concern for reputation and fear of retaliation from cooperative
partners. The ECJ (not the ECHR) poses a challenge to our argument only if it is properly
considered an adjudicator of truly interstate disputes rather than the adjudicator of
disputes that arise within a state-like union or confederation. We believe that the
relationship between states within the European Union are closer to the relationship
between, say, Illinois and Indiana, then the relationship between Indonesia and Peru.
European states share a legislative body, a bureaucracy, and a decades-long commitment
to political unity. Other states do not.
In our view, the degree of political unity is the causal factor. When states are not
unified, only dependent adjudicators can be effective. As states become more unified,
greater independence for adjudicators becomes possible.208 The conclusion of Andrew
Moravcsik, although only about human rights enforcement, is general: “[t]he most
effective institutions for international human rights enforcement rely on prior
sociological, ideological and institutional convergence toward common norms.”209
Although there are surely complex feedback effects, the weight of the evidence supports
our story. The ICJ has not brought the world together; why should we think that the ECJ
has brought Europe together?
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWER TRIBUNALS
In this Part, we draw on our earlier conclusions to predict the fate of two
relatively new international tribunals whose effectiveness cannot yet be gauged: the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS). Designers of new international tribunals seem to have taken the opinions of
international legal scholars to heart, and have sought to further increase the institutional
independence of new courts in the hopes of increasing their legitimacy and ultimately
their ability to achieve compliance. As we have indicated in Part III, however, we believe
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that these efforts to guarantee independence through permanent judges and compulsory
jurisdiction, will only lead to low rates of use and compliance by state parties.
A. International Criminal Court (ICC)
The ICC was created by the Statute of Rome, which was opened for signature in
1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002 when the required number of 60 states had
ratified.210 Under the treaty, the ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and, after further negotiations are completed, aggression. The ICC
would hear cases, for example, of the deliberate targeting of civilians by commanders, the
torture and execution of prisoners of war, or the systematic effort to destroy a national,
racial, or ethnic group. Until establishment of the ICC, enforcement of the laws of war
relied primarily upon domestic legal systems, and states generally have been reluctant to
punish their leaders or former leaders for war crimes.211
Rather than resolving disputes between states, the Court adjudicates prosecutions
of individual defendants. The prosecutions are brought by a special international
prosecutor. The ICC exercises its jurisdiction over crimes i) committed by a national of a
state party or ii) that occur on the territory of a state party when committed by the
national of a non-state party. While focused on individual conduct, the Rome Statute
makes an important nod to states. It incorporates the principle of “complementarity,”
which provides that the Court will not hear a case if a state party with jurisdiction
investigates or prosecutes the conduct in good faith.212 If, however, the prosecutor can
show that the state has conducted its investigation or prosecution in bad faith, it can bring
the case to the ICC.
The Court is composed of eighteen permanent judges who are elected by an
assembly of the state parties for nonrenewable terms of six or nine years, or renewable
three year terms. They must be nationals of the state parties. The office of the prosecutor
is also filled with a person selected by the state parties, for a nonrenewable nine year
term. The state parties have no control over the prosecutor’s decision as to what
investigations to undertake, what prosecutions to bring, and how to conduct the trial. The
prosecutor’s decisions on these matters are, however, subject to review by the Court
itself.213
The ICC is apparently independent of the United Nations Security Council.
Recent war crimes tribunals, such as the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, were created by the Security Council. Proponents of the ICC believed, however,
that the veto enjoyed by the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France,
Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) would undermine the universality of
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international criminal justice by allowing them to exempt themselves and their allies from
the jurisdiction of a new court.214 While the Security Council may refer cases to the ICC
prosecutor, and it may delay prosecutions for renewable 12-month terms, it may not
actually prevent an ICC case from going forward.
However, the ICC, like all other international tribunals, relies on the good will of
states. The ICC prosecutor has no independent authority to conduct investigations, gather
evidence, interview witnesses, and arrest suspects on the territory of state parties. Instead,
the prosecutor must ask state parties to perform these functions for it. In addition, the
prosecutor must request that state parties surrender individual defendants for transfer to
the seat of the Court. A good example of the difficulties on this point is presented by the
ICTY’s ability to gain jurisdiction over Slobodan Milosevic. It was not the ICTY’s
demands that led to his apprehension and transfer, but the United States’ military and
diplomatic pressure on Serbia, including a threat to withhold a half a billion dollars in
IMF and U.S. economic aid, that led to his transfer to the ICTY in the Hague.215 The
Rome Statute does not provide for any sanction if a state party obstructs the prosecutor’s
efforts. This has led some commentators to observe that the ICC prosecutor’s institutional
weakness could undermine the Court.216
We predict that the ICC will not prove to be an effective court. Although the
Rome Statute is aimed at individual defendants, the ICC’s jurisdiction strikes at the heart
of state interests. Prosecutions will inevitably raise questions concerning both the legality
of a decision by a state to use force and the legality of the tactics used by a state under
international law (both jus in bellum and jus ad bello). As Madeline Morris has observed,
“In ICC cases in which a state’s national is prosecuted for an official act that the state
maintains was lawful or that the state maintains did not occur, the lawfulness or the
occurrence of that official state act . . . would form the very subject matter of the
dispute.”217 In addition, states with military forces that operate abroad will fear that
soldiers and their commanders, including the highest political authorities responsible for
military activities, will be dragged in front of an international court for war crimes
prosecution, and be inconvenienced and embarrassed even if not prosecuted and
punished. And then, because the definitions of international crimes are so vague, soldiers
and officials might find themselves punished for activities that they consider legal and
routine.218 Because of these concerns, the United States not only has withdrawn its
signature from the Statute of Rome, but it has launched an aggressive diplomatic
campaign to protect American soldiers and civilians from its reach.219
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The withdrawal of the United States, which can be traced directly to the
independence of the court (that is, the lack of an American veto that could be used to
block prosecution of Americans or the nationals of allies) was a blow to the ICC. As the
nation that has taken the lead in conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian missions
throughout the world (currently averaging 100 U.S. missions), the activities of the United
States would have been particularly vulnerable to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The other
major states that conduct military activities, or have strong military concerns have also
refused to ratify the Rome Statutes. These states include China, Russia, India, Pakistan,
and Israel.220 Like the United States, these states will pressure state parties not to
extradite their nationals to the seat of the ICC if those nationals are found on the state
parties’ territory. Although not all states will bow to this pressure, those that do will be in
violation of their obligations under the Rome Statute; indeed, those that have signed
bilateral immunity agreements with the United States arguably are already failing to
comply with the Rome Statute.221
We predict that as time passes and more states put pressure on other states to
violate their obligations under the ICC, the only remaining state parties will be states that
do not conduct significant military activities on foreign territory, and that most state
parties will not comply with the extradition requirements. War criminals will appear
before the ICC only in those rare cases where they are nationals of a defeated state whose
new government seeks to acquire international legitimacy. Operations like those
performed by the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals—classic ex post tribunals whose
jurisdictions and powers are defined after the events, so that the states that establish them
may immunize themselves—may in future be performed by the ICC, but this is just to say
that with its wings clipped the ICC will become just another dependent international
tribunal.
B. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was created by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was concluded in
1982 and went into force in November, 1994.222 The ITLOS first sat two years later.
UNCLOS, which currently has 143 parties, creates two related international regimes: one
governs the development of the resources of the international seabed through an
international organization, the International Seaboard Authority; the second deals with
the traditional uses of the sea, such as navigation rights and rights in territorial seas.
The ITLOS is a permanent court with jurisdiction over all questions arising under
the UNCLOS. State parties generally have consented to compulsory jurisdiction of
disputes. The Tribunal consists of 21 independent members, who are elected for
renewable nine-year terms by the state parties to the Convention. Judges are to represent
the world’s different legal systems and geographic regions. If a state party to a dispute
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does not have a judge of its nationality on the tribunal, it may—as with the ICJ—appoint
an ad hoc judge for purposes of that case.
Under Article 287 of the UNCLOS, nations may choose among four mechanisms
for resolution of law of the sea disputes: ITLOS, the ICJ, arbitration, or resort to a special
arbitration panel. Upon acceding to the UNCLOS, state parties must file a declaration
choosing the forum for adjudication of disputes under the Convention. If all the parties to
a dispute have chosen ITLOS as its forum, then they have effectively chosen compulsory
jurisdiction and any one of the parties may then send the dispute to the Tribunal. State
parties may also reach an ad hoc agreement to submit a particular dispute, ex post, or an
ex ante class of disputes governed by a treaty, to the ITLOS. State parties with a legal
interest in a dispute between two other parties may move to intervene in the adjudication.
Articles 297 and 298 permit nations to make exceptions to their declarations
accepting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These include cases involving violations of the
Convention that are authorized under international law, which clearly is meant to
encapsulate the right to self-defense, military activities, and law enforcement activities.
There are two categories of cases, however, in which accession to the UNCLOS creates
mandatory jurisdiction over a dispute between state parties. Under Article 292 of the
Convention, one state party may seek adjudication in the ITLOS if another state party has
detained its vessel and crew in violation of the Convention. Under Article 187, the
ITLOS has compulsory jurisdiction over seabed disputes.
There has been little activity during the Court’s seven years of operation. There is
only a single pending case that appears to be currently active on the ITLOS docket.223
The Court has heard only ten disputes overall, five of which were claims for prompt
release of a nation’s crew or vessel that fall within the ITLOS compulsory jurisdiction.224
Although the Court has been in existence for only seven years, given the large number of
state parties and the potentially broad jurisdiction—theoretically, every detention of a
ship or crew by a state party could give ground for a suit—the usage rate so far is
extremely low. We do not yet have compliance rates for the ITLOS.
These current statistics are an early indication that the ITLOS will not be
effective. Our explanation should by now be familiar. Because of the independence of the
tribunal, states have little influence over how it resolves disputes. Thus, they cannot
expect widespread compliance. If compliance is likely to be weak, there is little point in
using the tribunal in the first place.
Conclusion
Scholars who favor the trend toward the judicialization of international law argue
that international dispute resolution bodies should become more “court-like.” Some, such
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as Thomas Franck, adjudication by authentic international courts contributes to the
legitimacy of international law, without which international cooperation is difficult or
impossible to achieve.225 Harold Koh argues that international adjudication contributes to
internalization of international law by domestic political actors, part of what he calls
“transnational legal process.”226 Helfer and Slaughter argue that international tribunals
are effective when they decide cases based “on principle rather than power.”227 These
scholars are just a few members of an academic consensus that holds that expanding the
use of independent international tribunals enhances their effectiveness and the spread of
the rule of law in international affairs.
We believe that this thesis is exaggerated and dangerously optimistic. We have
found no evidence that independent tribunals are more effective than dependent tribunals,
and some evidence that the reverse true: that independent tribunals are less effective than
dependent tribunals. The primary difference between our view and the conventional
wisdom can be summarized as a dispute about direction of causation. The conventional
wisdom holds that independent tribunals lead to political unification. We argue that
political unification makes independent tribunals possible. In the international realm,
where there is no political unification, international tribunals cannot be both independent
and effective. This is not to claim, as some have, that international tribunals themselves
serve no useful purpose. As we have explained, international tribunals can help states
resolve disputes by providing information on the facts or rules of conduct, so long as the
tribunals act consistently with interests of the states that create them.
Our arguments also explain why international adjudication is fragmented rather
than unified like a domestic legal system, to the enduring disappointment of international
legal scholars.228 By limiting the jurisdiction of international tribunals, states maintain
control over how they decide cases. When particular adjudicators and tribunals act
against the interest of states, the latter can pressure them or stop using them without
bringing down the whole system and affecting adjudications in other areas of
international relations, as would be the case if a single international supreme court
controlled the entire system.
Why has the conventional wisdom gone astray? A possible answer is that
international legal scholars have mistakenly seized on Europe as a model whose lessons
can be easily generalized to the international sphere. We suspect that this mistake has
been compounded by a false domestic analogy. It is often argued that the U.S. Supreme
Court forged a nation by asserting its supremacy in Marbury v. Madison, and then
enforcing federal power against the centrifugal tendencies of the states. Although this
story has been widely criticized, it has retained its power over the legal mind, which
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aspires to solve political conflicts as much possible through the rule of law.229
International law scholars seized on this analogy, and claimed to find a similar process
occurring in Europe through the ECJ.230 The final step has been to argue that
international courts can perform the same function for the whole world.231 This logic is
flawed. What might have happened in a small, homogenous republic at the beginning of
the nineteenth century can hardly be expected to repeat itself (even if it did happen here)
at the international level.
Much depends on whether the conventional wisdom is correct or we are. Taking
independence as the causal variable, Slaughter and Helfer reason that ineffective
international institutions such as the UN human rights committees should be transformed
into courts. Although they acknowledge the existence of constraints, they believe that
more independent, court-like committees would be more effective than the existing
committees.232 By contrast, we argue that granting international tribunals independence
before political unification has been achieved can only weaken them and prevent them
from accomplishing the modest good that they can otherwise do. This is not just an
academic argument. The creators of the new international courts of broad jurisdiction—
the ICC, the WTO, and the ITLOS—have followed the conventional wisdom and sought
to guarantee their success by granting them independence. Our analysis suggests that
these three courts will have diminished chances of success, as already indicated by steps
being taken by states to avoid or weaken their jurisdiction. Although it is too soon to tell
whether these institutions will succeed or fail, and their success or failure will depend on
many factors, we argue that weakening their independence would, while limiting their
potential for doing great things, also increase the chance that they will survive long
enough to do some modest good.
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Eric A Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
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229

See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Larry Kramer, Foreword: We the Court,
115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001). But see Sai Prakash & John Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 887 (2003).
230
See Weiler & Mancini, supra note __; see also Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law,
supra note __, at 19.
231
A recent and typical example of this view is Martinez, supra note __.
232
Slaughter and Helfer, supra note __.

64

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other
Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach (July 1991)
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of
Custom in the Law of Tort (August 1991)
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (September 1991)
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract (February 1992)
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools (February
1992)
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of AIDS (April 1992)
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April 1992)
William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis (July
1992)
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study (August 1992)
Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical
Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy (September 1992)
Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts (November 1992)
Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January 1993)
J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages: Cotton Spinning
Cartels in Imperial Japan (March 1993)
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law (April 1993)
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does) (April 1993)
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial
Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital (August 1993)
J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the
Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory
Adjudication (September 1993)
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (September 1993)
Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis (October 1993)
Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle (March 1994)
Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law (June 1994)
William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis (June 1994)
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan
(August 1994)
Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows (August 1994)
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property
Protection of Software (August 1994)
Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994)
David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond Cimino (December
1994)
Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime
Consumption (January 1995)

65

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages (February 1995)
Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller, Explaining Deviations
from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for
Litigation (March 1995)
Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American Business
Enterprise (April 1995)
Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995)
J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995)
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology
(November 1995)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January 1996)
J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law
Regimes: Econometrics from Japan (January 1996)
Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences
Make Good Neighbors? (March 1996)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes
Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles (July 1996)
John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns (August 1996)
Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs (September 1996)
G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and
Economics of Financially Distressed Firms (March 1997)
Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March 1997)
William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay
(March 1997)
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997)
John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness:
Evidence from California’s State Legislative Races (May 1997)
Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to
the Adoption of Norms (June 1997)
Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through
the Lens of Laissez-Faire (August 1997)
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) (December 1997)
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence:
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are
Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger (February 1998)
Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic
Analysis of Law (March 1998)
Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens? (April 1998)
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics (May 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?: Affirmative Action,
Police Departments, and Crime (May 1998)

66

57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (June
1998)
Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determinants,
Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional
Attempts to Limit Awards (July 1998)
Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (August 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and
Scope of Government? (September 1998)
Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October
1998)
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law
(November 1998)
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law
(November 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism (December
1998)
Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward A
“Third Way” (January 1999)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence (February
1999)
Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods
(February 1999)
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise (February
1999)
Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with
Particular Application to Sexual Harassment (March 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically? (March 1999)
Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine, Environmental
Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs (March 1999)
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis (April
1999)
John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shooting,
Bombings, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private
and Public Law Enforcement (April 1999)
Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study (May 1999)
Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It Back Together Again
(May 1999)
William M. Landes, Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz
Collection (May 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence? (June 1999)
Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a
Function of Technological Change (June 1999)
David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999)
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error (August 1999)

67

81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic
than Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages (September
1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999)
Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special
Reference to Law and Economics (September 1999)
Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel (October 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis (October 1999)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal
Decisionmaking: The Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy (October
1999)
Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of
Personal Characteristics (November 1999)
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted (November 1999)
Richard A. Posner, Orwell versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and
Satire (November 1999)
David A. Weisbach, Should the Tax Law Require Current Accrual of Interest on
Derivative Financial Instruments? (December 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (December 1999)
Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (January 2000)
Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and
Complexity in Contracts (January 2000)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s
Ghost (February 2000)
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating about Dollars:
The Severity Shift (February 2000)
Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with
Special Reference to Sanctions (March 2000)
Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies (April
2000)
Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity in Consumption (May
2000)
David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Laws (May
2000, revised May 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work (June 2000)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error (June 2000)
Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative
Position (August 2000)
Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions (September 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles (October 2000)
Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Internet (November 2000)
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (November 2000)
Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent
System (November 2000)

68

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International
Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000)
William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts (December 2000)
Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation (December 2000)
Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms (December
2000)
Richard A. Epstein and Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious
Liability, Class Actions and the Patient’s Bill of Rights (December 2000)
William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach (December 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule (January 2001)
George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital
(January 2001)
Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption (February 2001)
Richard Hynes and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer
Finance (February 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Academic Fads and Fashions (with Special Reference to Law)
(March 2001)
Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive
Political Theory Perspective (April 2001)
Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale? Rights of Publicity in the Digital
Age (April 2001)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganization (April 2001)
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters (May 2001)
William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished?
(May 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (May
2001)
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, The
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks (June 2001)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making (June
2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks after ATA (June 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear (June 2001)
Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution: The Hidden Perils of Property
Transfer (July 2001)
Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for
Centralized Coordination in a Networked World (July 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments (July 2001)
Eric A. Posner, Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts (August 2001)
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions (August 2001)
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on
the Commons (August 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (September 2001)

69

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of
Property Exemption Laws (September 2001)
Eric A. Posner and George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an
Incomplete Contracts Perspective (September 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law
(November 2001)
Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, Throwing Good Money after Bad?
Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending (December 2001)
Alan O. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
“Solution” (February 2002)
Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation
(February 2002)
Daniel N. Shaviro and David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in
Compaq v. Commissioner (February 2002) (Published in Tax Notes, January 28,
2002)
Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation
and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System (March 2002, Journal of Legal
Studies 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy: Its Unintended and Intended
Consequences (March 2002, forthcoming Cato Journal, summer 2002)
David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes (March 2002, Texas Law
Review)
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success
or Failure (March 2002)
Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution
(April 2002, The Antitrust Bulletin)
David A. Weisbach, Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income (April 2002,
Coase Lecture February 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (April 2002)
Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 2002)
Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence (May 2002, updated January
2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (May
2002; revised March 2003)
Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What
a Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright
(July 2002)
Anne Gron and Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the
Government as Insurer? (July 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law (with
Notes on Interpretive Theory) (August 2002)
Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent
and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright (September 2002)

70

160.
161
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War (September 2002)
Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for
Tort and Contract Law (September 2002)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks (September 2002)
David A. Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot? (September 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (September 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (October 2002)
Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief (October
2002)
Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom (November 2002)
Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget
(November 2002)
Avraham D. Tabbach, Criminal Behavior: Sanctions and Income Taxation: An
Economic Analysis (November 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of “Old” Public Health: The Legal Framework for
the Regulation of Public Health (December 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (December 2002)
David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates
(December 2002)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy (December
2002)
Richard A. Epstein, Into the Frying Pan: Standing and Privity under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Beyond (December 2002)
Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of
Short-Term Assets (January 2003)
Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act? (January 2003)
Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon (January 2003)
William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective (February 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003)
Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion
(April 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April
2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an
Oxymoron (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May
2003)

71

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective
(May 2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June
2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Trade Secrets as Private Property: Their Constitutional
Protection (June 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay (June 2003)
Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems
(July 2003)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (July 2003)
David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs (September 2003)
William L. Meadow, Anthony Bell, and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not
Memories: What Was the Standard of Care for Administering Antenatal Steroids
to Women in Preterm Labor between 1985 and 2000? (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage (September 2003)
Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and
Content (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (September 2003)
Avraham D. Tabbach, The Effects of Taxation on Income Producing Crimes with
Variable Leisure Time (October 2003)
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October
2003)
David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Fear and Liberty (January 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication
(February 2004)

72

